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Abstract of the Dissertation
Three Essays on Separation of Powers and Competitive Elections
by
Myunghoon Kang
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Randall Calvert, Chair
This dissertation examines how separation of powers and competitive elections affect the
policymaking process at its various stages. First, I explore how the super-majoritarian rule
in the legislature, which is the consequence of separation of powers, affects votersâ elec-
toral decisions, which in turn indirectly affects the policy outcome. I demonstrate that the
super-majoritarian rule of the legislative policymaking process creates not only a legislative
gridlock but also incentives that lead some districts to strategically elect more ideologically
extreme delegates in certain circumstances, which expands the legislative gridlock region.
Second, I examine when competitive elections can restrain the president’s unilateral policy-
making power. The key innovation is that the president’s exercise of unilateral policymaking
power reduces the turnout of the president’s supporters in the election, which restrain the
president’s unilateral action when the election is sufficiently competitive. Finally, I examine
how separation of powers affect voters’ welfare during the policy implementation stage. A
central finding of the essay is that separation of powers can improve voters’ welfare by mit-
igating the malign effects of electoral competition: the incumbent presidentâs underfunding
to avoid the electoral risks associated with policy implementation. Specifically, separation of
powers can improve the effectiveness of policy implementation by placing the power of the
purse to one who has to provide larger funds for policy implementation to win the election.
viii
Chapter 1. Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the consequences of the interactions between two
fundamental political institutions that underlie the representative democracy in the U.S.:
competitive elections and separation of powers. Those two political institutions are sup-
posed to address the inherent tension embedded in a representative democracy. As the word
democracy suggests, policy outcomes under representative democracy need to be aligned
with citizens’ preferences. To be responsive to citizens’ preferences, direct democracy might
be the ideal form of democracy. However, in a mass society, it is very inefficient and nearly
impossible to make every political decision in the form of direct democracy. In this sense,
the high efficiency and practicality of a representative democracy, where a few elected offi-
cials govern, justifies the political system of representative democracy. Moreover, if the word
representative means that the elected officials are merely those who do not have any auton-
omy but make the citizens’ voices present in the policymaking process as described in the
delegate model of representation (see Pitkin (1967)), representative democracy is the form
of democracy that enhances the efficiency of governing without loss of any responsiveness.
However, the meaning of the word representative is not limited to delegates. As Edmund
Burke (1790 [1968]) and John Stuart Mill (1861 [1962]) argued, elected officials must be wise
and autonomous enough to implement a good policy for citizens even though the imple-
mented policy is not popular. This trustee model of representation has a long intellectual
tradition traced back at least to Plato’s fear of ochlocracy (see Plato (2003)). The rationale
1
behind the election of trustees is as follows. A policy is a tool for achieving the desired out-
come for citizens. However, citizens are not well-informed about policy. Hence, those who
are more knowledgeable must be elected as representatives, and they should be autonomous
in the policymaking process to protect democracy from degenerating into mobocracy. This
idea of the trustee model of representation has been advocated by many ancient intellectu-
als. For example, Cicero (1928) and Polybius (2002) believed that a mixed constitution that
combines democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy (or kingship) is the ideal form of political
system that will prevent the society from being corrupted into ochlocracy while it allows the
people as a whole to make fundamental decisions (see Radford (2002) and Asmis (2005)).
In fact, the political institutions of the U.S. can be seen as a modern application of
a mixed constitution, where the president (i.e., monarchy), the Senate (i.e., aristocracy),
and the House (i.e., democracy) exist simultaneously. However, although this representative
democracy as trustee model may eliminate the danger of ochlocracy, there exists a new type
of danger that is absent in the delegate model of representation: the advent of tyranny or
oligarchy. Ironically, this new problem originates from the solution to eliminate the danger
of mobocracy. Based on the informational advantage, political elites may choose a policy
that promotes their private interests but makes believe that the policy is for the public good.
Separation of powers can be seen as the principle of political institutions to address this
problem. Separation of powers prevents a certain faction of political elites from concentrating
powers that leads to tyranny or oligarchy. Separation of powers splits the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers into three branches of government so that each branch’s ambition
can be used to check and balance the ambition of the other branches to prevent unfettered
government power. In other words, separation of powers sets the rules that govern the be-
haviors of political elites, which will enforce them to promote citizens’ welfare.
In sum, competitive elections and separation of powers are central political institutions
that prevent representative democracy from being corrupted into either destructive mob-
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rule or undemocratic tyranny. These two underlying institutions determine “who gets what,
when, how” (Lasswell 1936 [1958]) in the U.S. politics and provide the legitimacy with the
political outcomes as “an authoritative allocation of values for a society” (Easton 1965).
Although competitive elections and separation of powers are the hallmarks of representa-
tive democracy, such a normative claim does not guarantee that these institutions actually
lead to a responsive and efficient government. This is where formal theory is required. For-
mal theory allows us to investigate if these institutions can work as expected. In particular,
formal theory has a significant advantage in analyzing the effects of separation of powers and
competitive elections on the policymaking process because these two political institutions
render the policymaking a strategic game.
The main theme of the dissertation is that the interaction between competitive elections
and separation of powers might be a new clue to understanding interesting puzzles we ob-
serve in U.S. politics. Elections and the separation of powers may complementarily interact
to maintain representative democracy in good form, or it may produce unexpected harmful
effects. This dissertation attempts to discover some aspects of these important implications
of the interaction between competitive elections and separation of powers. In particular, this
dissertation focuses on the three distinct aspects of the policymaking process: election and
legislative gridlock, the president’s unilateral policymaking power, and funding decisions in
the policy implementation stage.
In the first essay, entitled “Representation, Sophisticated Voting, and the Size of the
Gridlock Region,” I explore how a super-majoritarian legislative policymaking process af-
fects votersâ electoral decisions, which in turn indirectly affects the policy outcome. I extend
the pivotal politics model by incorporating the election stage in which each of multiple het-
erogeneous electoral districts elects its delegate to the super-majoritarian legislative body.
With this simple but critical twist to the standard model of pivotal politics, I show that the
super-majoritarian rule of the legislative policymaking process creates not only a legislative
3
gridlock but also incentives that lead some districts to strategically elect more ideologically
extreme delegates in certain circumstances, which expands the legislative gridlock region.
In the second essay, entitled “Presidential Unilateral Actions as a Tool of Voter Mobiliza-
tion,” I examine when elections can restrain the president’s unilateral policymaking power.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is that the presidentâs unilateral policymaking
power is considered to be the presidentâs voter mobilization power as well. Specifically, the
presidential unilateral action sends the message to a certain subset of potentially pivotal vot-
ers that the president cares about them, which mobilizes the targeted voters by increasing
their expressive benefits of voting for the president. At the same time, however, the presi-
dential unilateral action activates voters’ constitutional concerns, which demobilizes voters
by incurring additional costs of voting for the president. Hence, if the demobilizing effect
of the presidentâs unilateral action outweighs the mobilizing effect of it, then the president
does not have an incentive to exercise his unilateral policymaking power even in the absence
of checks and balances from the other branches of the government.
Finally, in the third essay, entitled “The Welfare Implications of Separation of Powers
and Competitive Elections in Policy Implementation,” builds on implementation literature
that views policy implementation as a continuation of the political game from the policy for-
mation stage. A central finding of the essay is that separation of powers can improve voters’
welfare by mitigating the malign effects of electoral competition: the incumbent president’s
underfunding to avoid the electoral risks associated with policy implementation. Specifically,
separation of powers can improve the effectiveness of policy implementation by placing the
power of the purse to one who has to provide larger funds for policy implementation to win
the election. The model in this essay also shows that political stalemate caused by separation
of powers does not necessarily reduce voters’ welfare. Rather, political stalemate can prevent
over-funding in the policy that is not preferred by voters. This essay contributes to both
democracy theory and policy implementation literature by providing the welfare grounds of
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normative prescriptions for enhancing both the effectiveness of policymaking and electoral
accountability.
I do not argue that these three essays present a comprehensive picture of American pol-
itics. Rather, I believe that these three essays shed light on important aspects of American
politics in the context of representative democracy. After all, we established political institu-
tions to govern our political life in both an efficient and democratic way. Harmonizing these
two goals are not easy but not impossible. However, it would be possible only if we correctly
understand how the two fundamental institutions interact with each other and what are the




Sophisticated Voting, and the Size of
the Gridlock Region1
2.1 Introduction
Legislative gridlock is endemic to contemporary American politics. As one commentator
stated, “[F]rom the federal shutdown to gun control, stalemate is America’s political norm.”2
Most commentators and many scholars blame politicians for legislative stalemate. According
to this view, legislative gridlock seems like the consequence of politicians’ partisan tactics in
order to achieve their partisan goals at the expense of legislative productivity.
However, voters elect politicians in the first place in a representative democracy. In fact,
legislative stalemate can be seen as a natural consequence of elections as long as voters have
different ideal policies. However, if the degree of legislative stalemate is more severe than
what appropriately represents the level of disagreement among voters, and if this exaggera-
tion is caused by voters’ rational electoral decisions independent of any force from partisan
politics, we can say at least that voters partly contribute to the malfunction of the legisla-
1This chapter has been published at the Journal of Theoretical Politics 29(4), pp. 623-646.
2E.W. 2014. “Political Gridlock: Unprecedentedly Dysfunctional.” The Economist, September 22.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/political-gridlock (June 8, 2016).
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ture. It thus seems important to understand the role of the electorate in determining the
degree of legislative gridlock.
Since Mayhew’s landmark study on the performance of legislature (1991), many scholars
have delved into the causes of legislative gridlock. There are two distinct approaches in this
line of research. On the one hand, scholars have focused on inter-branch partisan conflict as
a main cause of legislative gridlock (Mayhew 1991, 2005; Kelly 1993; Edwards et al. 1997;
Binder 1999, 2003; Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009). A
primary debate in this regard is whether a divided government causes the stalemate and
therefore exacerbates legislative productivity. Although scholars have not reached an agree-
ment as to whether a divided government is the main culprit of legislative gridlock, they
at least agree that party control is the ultimate cause of the fluctuations in the legislative
gridlock.
On the other hand, several scholars have emphasized the interplay of the individual pref-
erences of nonpartisan legislators as another main cause of legislative gridlock (Krehbiel
1996, 1998; Brady and Volden 1998). They exclude the play of partisanship and show that
legislative gridlock is the consequence of individual legislators’ rational behaviors under the
governing institution. This approach is consistent with the counter-intuitive empirical find-
ings from Mayhew (1991, 2005) and others (e.g., Clinton and Lapinski 2006; Chiou and
Rothenberg 2008) that a divided government does not have a negative impact on legislative
productivity, which implies a low level of gridlock.
Although these partisan and non-partisan approaches are substantively different from
each other, they all implicitly assume that politicians cause the fluctuations of the legislative
gridlock. This is because both approaches neglect the simple fact that politicians are elected
by voters in the first place under a representative democracy. As a result, both approaches
do not pay attention to the possible role of the electorate in exacerbating legislative stale-
mate.
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In fact, there are several studies in which voters are conceived to be partly responsible
for legislative gridlock because they elect polarized legislators (Pfiffner 2014; Binder 2015).
These studies simply assume that polarization in Congress is the natural consequence of
ideologically polarized voters. Although this view focuses on the role of the electorate in
the degree of legislative stalemate, they view that legislative malfunction is not a systematic
consequence of an institutional setting but rather a merely unfortunate mirror image of po-
larized voters.3
My formal model, however, provides a different approach. It shows that there is an
institutional force that exacerbates legislative gridlock, and this institutional force mainly
comes from voters’ rational voting behavior with the supermajority rule in the legislative
policy-making process. Under the supermajority rule, the policy outcome is determined by
the position of the relevant pivotal legislator. Knowing this, some voters are incentivized to
elect a legislator whose ideal policy is different from theirs; that is, they have incentive to
elect a more ideologically extreme legislator than themselves. As a result of this sophisti-
cated voting process, the size of the legislative gridlock region expands.
To demonstrate how this institutional force expands the size of a gridlock region, I build
the model based on Krehbiel’s nonpartisan model of pivotal politics (1996, 1998). Krehbiel’s
nonpartisan model is a good starting point since we can isolate any effect from partisan
politics on legislative malfunction, which enables us to focus on the role of the electorate
in determining the degree of legislative gridlock. That is, a nonpartisan model allows us to
analyze voters’ behaviors in the absence of any constraint placed by political parties (see
Weingast and Marshall (1988) for such a legislative model without partisan politics). The
key departure of the model from Krehbiel’s model is that voters take into account a likely
3Note that this line of research eventually focuses on partisan politics as a main culprit of legislative
dysfunction in the sense that political elites drive voter polarization. Levendusky (2010), for example,
argues that elite polarization enhances voter polarization by providing cues to voters (see also Jacobson
(2000) and Fleisher and Bond (2001)).
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policy outcome to be determined in the legislature when they elect their representatives (see
Austen-Smith 1986; Penn 2009; Harstad 2010; Klumpp 2010).4
All voters sophisticatedly make their decisions to maximize their utilities. As a result of
this strategic consideration, voters choose either legislators whose ideal points are congruous
with theirs or legislators whose ideal points are different from theirs. In this sense, all voters
sophisticatedly vote but such voting behaviors can be distinguished based on whether or not
their choices are congruous with their ideal points. To capture this idea, I use congruous
voting to refer to the sophisticated voting behavior that voters elect legislators whose ideal
points are congruous with their preferences. Meanwhile, I use incongruous voting to indicate
the sophisticated voting behavior that voters elect representatives whose ideal points are in-
congruous with their preferences. Note that congruous voting differs from sincere voting,
although both voting behaviors are observationally equivalent because sincere voting does
not come from voters’ sophisticated consideration. In this sense, congruous voting can be
seen as sophisticated sincerity (for the concept of sophisticated sincerity and its application,
see Austen-Smith (1987) and Glaeser et al. (2005)).
The main finding is that the gridlock region expands as a result of voters’ sophisticated
voting behaviors if the position of the status quo is neither too moderate nor too extreme.
Specifically, if the previous condition is satisfied, then i) at least one voter elects a repre-
sentative whose ideal policy is incongruous with her ideal points, ii) the voters who cast an
incongruous vote must elect candidates more ideologically extreme than themselves as their
representatives, and iii) those elected legislators by incongruous voting must be a pivotal
4This assumption of sophisticated voters may appear to be strong to some readers. However, many studies
present empirical evidence of voters’ sophisticated voting behaviors. For example, Ordeshook and Zeng (1997)
provide empirical evidence that voters act strategically in the voting booth. Abramson et al. (1992) also
confirm that voters’ choices in the 1988 U.S. presidential primaries are consistent with sophisticated voting.
Penn (2009) illustrates gay rights groups’ temporary retreat from winning the same-sex marriage right as
the strategic move of farsighted voters. All of these examples clearly show that voters take what will happen
in the future as a consequence of a current decision into account when they make a decision. Hence, I regard
the assumption to be justifiable in the sense that voters are farsighted and sophisticated.
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legislator who determines the legislative policy outcome in an equilibrium. As a result, in-
congruous voting always results in an expanded legislative gridlock region compared to the
counterfactual gridlock region that would have emerged if all of the voters had cast a con-
gruous vote. Hence, the expansion of the gridlock region depends on whether the position
of the status quo leads some voters to vote incongruously.
2.2 Related Formal Models
There are several models that show that incongruous voting can be optimal for voters
(Austen-Smith 1986; Chari et al. 1997; Harstad 2010; Klumpp 2010) when voters take
account of the post-election legislative bargaining process in the context of distributive poli-
tics among multi-constituencies. However, these models only focus on the consequent policy
outcomes and not on the consequent gridlock region from incongruous voting. Harstad
(2010) shows that a large majority requirement generally leads voters to incongruous vot-
ing, and the status quo is more likely to remain as a consequence of such voting. Klumpp
(2010) shows that incongruous voting is motivated by voters not knowing which member of
the legislature will propose a new bill. This uncertainty leads some voters to incongruous
voting as an insurance against an extreme policy outcome. This incongruous voting, in turn,
results in a conservative policy outcome, that is, a policy outcome biased toward the status
quo. Hence, the heterogeneity of districts is the main factor that determines the magnitude
of conservatism, that is, a smaller set of possible policy alternatives (i.e., a smaller set of
alternatives capable of defeating the status quo).
In contrast to the above models, I incorporate the gridlock interval into the model.
Moreover, I show that whether a voter’s choice deviates from her ideal policy depends on
the position of the status quo, and thus the status quo endogenously affects the width of the
gridlock region. In addition, the model shows that incongruous voting occurs even without
10
uncertainty about a future agenda setter.
There are other sophisticated voting models in a Downsian framework in which candi-
dates choose their policy platforms to get elected. Although these models focus on politi-
cians’ strategic decisions, there are some points relevant to the model. Aragonès and Palfrey
(2002), and Krasa and Polborn (2014) present “differentiated-candidate” models. In these
models, voters care about both the candidates’ idiosyncratic characteristics and their policy
positions. Krasa and Polborn (2016) advance their model by including both local candidates’
party labels and the legislative policy outcome in a voter’s utility function. The model ac-
cepts this idea that voters’ utilities consist of the dual components. Voters care about the
legislative policy outcome in the model. However, I include the ideological congruence be-
tween elected legislators and voters as the second component of voters’ utilities instead of
party labels. This is because the model rules out any possible effect of partisan politics on
legislative gridlock, as discussed above. In this regard, the model also differs from the model
of Krasa and Polborn (2016) in that there is no centralized nomination process conducted by
political parties. Furthermore, the model incorporates the important institutional features
of legislative politics in the United States: a presidential veto, a congressional veto override,
and a filibuster in the Senate. By adding these components of pivotal politics, the model
can examine the effect of voters’ electoral decisions on the size of the gridlock region, which
is not incorporated into their model.
Alesina and Rosenthal (2000), Callander (2005), and Palfrey (1984) explain that pol-
icy divergence is an equilibrium result of political parties’ strategies to deter other political
parties from entering the electoral competition in the context of multiple heterogeneous dis-
tricts. In particular, Alesina and Rosenthal’s model emphasizes that parties nominate a
legislator with an extreme policy platform because this extremity of policy will be canceled
out through the legislative bargaining process. These models and my model share a com-
mon feature in that they all incorporate multiple heterogeneous districts and the fact that
11
a voter’s payoff depends on other districts’ electoral results. However, the model shows that
an extreme legislator can be elected in certain districts even in the absence of the party
nomination process, which implies that the expansion of the gridlock region occurs even if
voters’ rational decisions are not hindered by uncertainty or the party nomination process.
This paper is organized as follows. I introduce the model in the next section. In section 4,
I provide the results. I will present two main results: i) the conditions of the status quo
that cause incongruous voting among voters and ii) that incongruous voting always leads
the legislative gridlock interval to expand if such conditions are satisfied. A discussion of the
model follows.
2.3 The Model
In the model, there is a legislative body in which a new bill is proposed by majority rule,
but the proposed bill is voted on by supermajority rule. The most famous example of this
setting is the U.S. federal legislature that was modeled by Krehbiel (1996). I assume a single-
dimensional policy space of R.5 There are n electoral districts, and I assume that n is an
odd number for simplicity.6 Following Klumpp (2010), I assume that there is a continuum
of voters whose ideal points are distributed on R with positive density everywhere in each
electoral district. I order all n electoral districts’ median points and index them in increasing
order. The index can be used interchangeably to denote the order of a particular electoral
district’s median point and the label of each electoral district. Let vi ∈ R denote the electoral
5To be precise, I use the predictive single policy dimension that is presented by Enelow and Hinich (1984)
to map multiple policy issues into a single dimensional policy space. Hence, the status quo in the model is
not a single policy issue per se but the weighted projection of multiple policy issues in the predictive single
dimensional policy space. To use the predictive single policy dimension, I assume the following: First, all
voters’ preferences are separable across multiple issues. Second, all voters have a common perception of the
status quo policies on each issue. Third, I assume that each voter weighs all issues equally so that their
preferences are based on Euclidean distance. Finally, I assume that all voters share the same ideological
measure. For more detail about the predictive dimension, see Enelow and Hinich (1984).
6I implicitly assume that n is sufficiently large to have the left and right pivotal legislators.
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district i’s median point. Then, v1 denotes the electoral district with the smallest median
point, and I refer to this electoral district as electoral district 1. Let m denote the median of
N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Following Klumpp (2010), the configuration of electoral districts’ medians
can be denoted by the vector v as follows:
v = (v1, v2, ..., vm, ..., vn−1, vn) ∈ Rn
where v1 < v2 < ... < vm < ... < vn−1 < vn. For convenience, I normalize districts’ median
points so that the median electoral district’s ideal point is 0 (i.e., vm = 0).
7 Following the
standard model of pivotal politics presented by Krehbiel (1996), let r,m, and l denote the
order in v for any electoral district to be the right, median, and left pivotal district, respec-
tively. Call electoral district vr the right pivotal district. Similarly, call electoral district vl
the left pivotal district.
Each electoral district simultaneously elects a legislator. Let ci ∈ R denote an ideal point
of a legislator who is elected in district i. The legislature consists of legislators from all of
the electoral districts and can be denoted by the vector c as in the following example:8
c = (c3, c2, ..., cn, ..., cm, cn−1) ∈ Rn.
Again, I order legislators’ ideal points in increasing order in the same fashion as I did for the
electoral districts. Let K : Rn → {1, ..., n} be a function such that K(ci, c−i) = k where k is
the order of an ideal point of a legislator that is from district i in the legislature formed after
the election. For example, K(ci, c−i) = 1 means that the ideal point of an elected legislator
7This normalization can be easily done by subtracting vm from all districts’ ideal points and the status
quo.
8Note that I allow the possibility that legislators elected in different electoral districts have the same ideal
point whereas I assume that all electoral districts have a different median point from each other.
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from district i is located at the first from the left in policy dimension R, which in turn
implies that district i has the most liberal legislator in the legislature c. I use a superscript
to denote the order of an ideal point of a legislator in the legislature c. For instance, ck
denotes a legislator whose ideological order is kth in c.
Similar to the definition of the right and left pivotal district, call legislator ci such that
K(ci, c−i) = r the right pivotal legislator and legislator ci such that K(ci, c−i) = l the left
pivotal legislator in legislature c. If more than one legislator has the same ideal point at
a pivotal position, then I consider both legislators as a pivotal legislator. For notational
convenience, I configure the notation so that cr, cm, cl denote the ideal point of the right
pivotal legislator, the left pivotal legislator, the median legislator, respectively.
I assume that there is a single representative voter in each district i, whose ideal point
is vi.
9 In addition, I assume that the ideal points of all voters are common knowledge.10
One crucial assumption that I make in the model is that voters know how the legislative
outcomes are determined. In other words, voters know that a new bill is proposed by the
median legislator but voted on by supermajority rule. This legislative policy-making process
may motivate voters to sophisticatedly elect a legislator.
Voters care about both the incongruence term of an elected legislator and the policy
outcome that is determined in the legislature. The incongruence term of an elected legislator
can be measured by the congruence between the elected legislator and the district median,
i.e., −(vi − ci)2. This measurement strategy is based on the fact that voters highly evaluate
a legislator who identifies himself as one of the voters and understands what the voters think
(Fenno, 1977). Voters also want a legislator who can yield the best policy outcome x that
9This assumption means that there is a decentralized electoral process which guarantees that the electoral
winner of each district maximizes the median voter’s utility in each district as the median voter theorem
predicts (see Klumpp (2010) for one example of such electoral process). This assumption strengthens the
findings in that the gridlock is expanded by elections even if the median voter has full control in each electoral
district.
10Voter i and district i are interchangeably used throughout the paper. The model is equivalent to that
each of n voters simultaneously chooses her agent who will cast a vote on the proposed bill in the legislature.
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replaces s0 through the legislative policy-making process. A voter’s utility function assumes
the following form:11
ui(ci, x(ci, c−i)) = −(vi − x)2 − (vi − ci)2.
I assume that the status quo policy s0 is determined by nature before the election.
Finally, I assume that the elected legislator is policy-motivated. The elected legislator’s
utility function is:
uci(x(ci, c−i)) = −(ci − x)2.
The game proceeds as follows:
i. Each district elects a legislator, ci,
ii. The median legislator proposes a new bill, and the bill is voted on,
iii. Payoffs are materialized, and the game ends.
11Some readers may wonder if the equilibrium is affected by the absence of congruence term in a voter’s
utility function. In fact, there is an infinite number of equilibria if I omit the congruence term from a voter’s
utility function. Note, however, that the equilibria that I identified with the congruence term still exist
as one specific type of multiple, possible equilibria without any congruence term. Hence, the congruence
term can be seen as a more restrictive equilibrium refinement that narrows our attention to equilibria with
substantive meaning. Also, a weight parameter for each component can be incorporated here, but I omit




2.4.1 Congruous Voting and the Non-expansion of the Gridlock
Region
The solution concept of the game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Since supermajority
is required to pass a bill in the legislature, we can use the following Lemma 1 to identify the
equilibrium policy outcome of the policy-making process in the legislature.
Lemma 1 (Krehbiel 1996). For each status quo s0 ∈ [cl, cr], no bill passes the legislature so
that the equilibrium legislative outcome is x = s0. If s0 /∈ [cl, cr], a new bill is proposed and
passes the legislature so that the equilibrium legislative outcome is then
x =

max{cm, 2cr − s0} if s0 > cr,
min{cm, 2cl − s0} if s0 < cl.
Lemma 1 follows from the standard model of pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1996). Lemma 1
states that the legislative outcome depends on the relative positions of the status quo and
pivotal legislators. Since the status quo is exogenously determined in the model, the only
way to affect the legislative outcome is to change the position of pivotal legislators. More
specifically, the pivotal legislator closest to the status quo determines the equilibrium policy
outcome. I call such a pivotal legislator the effective pivotal legislator.
We need to identify the Nash equilibrium permutation of legislators in which no voter has
any incentive to deviate. From this reasoning, we can define the Nash equilibrium legislature
as follows:
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Definition 1. A legislature c∗ = (c∗i , c
∗







−i)) ≥ ui(ci, x(ci, c∗−i)) for all ci 6= c∗i and for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Additionally, I define a gridlock region in a legislature as follows:
Definition 2. In a given legislature, the interval [cl, cr] is the gridlock region.
We need a baseline gridlock region to determine whether sophisticated voting independently
expands the gridlock region. For this purpose, we can think of a counterfactual gridlock
region that would be created if all voters cast an ideologically sincere vote.12
Definition 3. In a given legislature, the interval [vl, vr] is the counterfactual baseline grid-
lock region.
If the gridlock region in the legislative body is larger than the counterfactual baseline grid-
lock region, we can conclude that the electoral process causes the expansion of the gridlock
region. Regardless of the degree of polarization among voters, we can measure the portion
of expansion of the gridlock region that is caused via the electoral process by comparing the
gridlock region with the counterfactual baseline gridlock region.
There are two types of sophisticated voting behaviors: incongruous voting and congruous
voting. Recall that voters care about both the legislative outcome and the congruence be-
tween legislators and themselves. These two components of a voter’s utility function render
incongruous voting costly. Incongruous voting may increase a voter’s benefit by yielding
a more preferred legislative outcome, but it also increases a voter’s disutility by electing a
12A counterfactual gridlock region can be interpreted as a gridlock region in a legislature in which legislators
are purely representatives who make their voters present again in the policy-making process. See Pitkin
(1967) for the definition of such representation.
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legislator who does not perfectly represent the voter. Hence, a voter would cast an incon-
gruous vote only if incongruous voting provides enough policy benefits to compensate for
the incongruence cost. Furthermore, the following Lemma 2 states that voters elect more
extreme representatives than they are when they cast an incongruence vote.
Lemma 2. No district elects a legislator ci < vi in any equilibrium legislature when s0 > 0.
Similarly, no district elects a legislator ci > vi in any equilibrium legislature when s0 < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can deduce the following Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. If s0 > 0, then c
∗
i = vi in any equilibrium legislature c
∗ for all i such that
vi ≥ s0 > 0. Similarly, if s0 < 0, then c∗i = vi in any equilibrium legislature c∗ for all i such
that vi ≤ s0 < 0.
To see the intuition behind Lemma 3, suppose s0 > 0 without loss of generality. By
Lemma 2, the ideal point of the representative from district i such that vi ≥ s0 must be
either greater than or equal to the status quo. If ci is the effective pivotal legislator in the
legislature, then ci = c
r ≥ vi ≥ s0, which means the legislature cannot pass a new bill
because the status quo is in the gridlock region. Then, the optimal choice for i is congruous
voting.
If ci is not the effective pivotal legislator, there are two possible sub-cases. First, the
effective pivotal legislator’s ideal point is less than the status quo (i.e., cr < s0). In this case,
the only way for voter i to become a new effective pivotal legislator is to elect a representative
whose ideal point is less than cr, which is not possible by Lemma 2. Hence, voter i cannot
change the policy outcome, which implies that congruous voting is optimal for voter i.
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Second, it is possible that the effective pivotal legislator’s ideal point is equal to or greater
than the status quo (i.e., cr ≥ s0). In this case, it is easy to see that the legislature cannot
pass a new bill because the status quo is in the gridlock region. The only way for voter i to
break this stalemate is to elect a moderate representative whose ideal point is less than the
status quo, which is not possible by Lemma 2. Hence, again, the optimal choice for voter i
is congruous voting. From Lemma 3, we can conclude as the following Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. No voter votes incongruously in any equilibrium legislature if s0 ∈ [vl, vr].
It is easy to understand Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, suppose 0 < s0 ≤ vr.
By Lemma 3, all voters whose ideal points are greater than or equal to vr will cast a congru-
ous vote. Therefore, it is guaranteed that there are at least n− r legislators to the right of
vr. If there are exactly n− r legislators to the right of vr, then a legislator from district r is
the effective pivotal legislator (i.e., cr = vr = cr), and the legislative outcome is s0 since the
status quo is in the gridlock region. If there are more than n−r legislators to the right of vr,
then the effective pivotal legislator’s ideal point must be greater than vr. In addition, it must
be that some voters whose ideal points are less than vr elected an extreme representative to
make this scenario happen. However, there is no incentive for voters whose ideal points are
less than vr to do so because the legislative outcome does not change due to the fact that s0
is in the gridlock region. Since voters whose ideal points are less than vr cannot change the
legislative outcome in both cases, their optimal choices are congruous voting by which they
can minimize the incongruence between their representatives and themselves.
The main rationale for Lemma 4 is that incongruous voting does not yield any addi-
tional benefit even if a voter manages to make her representative the pivotal legislator by
incongruous voting when s0 ∈ [vl, vr]. Therefore, she does not have any incentive to vote
incongruously, which only incurs an incongruence cost.
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However, Lemma 4 does not tell us about the existence of an incongruous voter when
s0 /∈ [vl, vr]. As the following Lemma 5 states, the existence of at least one incongruous voter
requires the status quo to not be too extreme.
Lemma 5. All voters cast a congruous vote in any equilibrium legislature if s0 > (1 +
√
5)vr
or s0 < (1 +
√
5)vl.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is that the benefits from improving the policy outcome
will not be substantial enough to compensate for the incongruence cost incurred by incon-
gruous voting when the status quo is too extreme. Note that the median legislator’s ideal
point is 0 by Lemma 6 below. Suppose s0 > 2vi, and suppose that it is guaranteed that ci
is the effective pivotal legislator. If voter i casts a congruous vote (i.e., ci = vi), then the
policy outcome is 0. Hence, incongruous voting is not profitable for voter i if the following
condition holds:13
−(vi − 0)2 > −(vi − 2ci + s0)2 − (vi − ci)2.




.14 Therefore, if the status quo s0 is so extreme that the above condition
holds even when she can get the maximum utility via incongruous voting from this game
(i.e., ci = c
∗
i ), then voter i always cast a congruous vote since the utility via incongruous
voting is always worse than the one from congruous voting. Setting ci = c
∗
i , it becomes
13I implicitly assume that voter i prefers incongruous voting to congruous voting if the utilities from both
voting behaviors are the same.
14Note that this maximum utility also requires that cr+1 ≥ 2s0+3vi5 .
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apparent that the above condition is reduced to the following condition:
s0 > (1 +
√
5)vi.
Hence, if s0 > (1 +
√
5)vi, voter i casts a congruous vote. Note that (1 +
√
5)vi is greater
than 2vi. If only congruous voting is allowed for voter i, she cannot yield a better policy
outcome than 0 by congruous voting if s0 > 2vi. However, incongruous voting expands the
range of the status quo where she can possibly manipulate to obtain a policy outcome other
than 0.
Now, suppose s0 > (1 +
√
5)vr. In this case, cr must be the effective pivotal legislator.
To see why, suppose that cr is not the effective pivotal legislator. Consider the case where
ci = c
r with vi < vr. Lemma 2 implies that ci = c
r > vr. If 2c
r−1 − s0 > vi, then switching
from incongruous voting to congruous voting yields a more preferable policy outcome for
voter i. Additionally, she can minimize the incongruence cost. Therefore, congruous voting
is optimal for voter i in this case. If 2cr−1−s0 ≤ vi, switching to congruous voting guarantees
that the policy benefits are at least as good as the policy benefits from 0. Moreover, she can
minimize the incongruence cost. Recall that s0 > (1 +
√
5)vr implies s0 > (1 +
√
5)vi, which
means the utility from incongruous voting is always less than the utility from the case where
the policy outcome is 0 and she chooses vi. Therefore, congruous voting is also optimal for
voter i. Therefore, we see that all voters whose ideal points are less than vr cast a congruous
vote when s0 > (1 +
√
5)vr.
Now, suppose that cr is not the effective pivotal legislator and suppose that ci = c
r with
vi > vr. Then, by Lemma 2 and the above observation, it must be that c
r−1 < vr < vi ≤
ci = c
r < cr. Then, voter r can improve her utility by choosing cr = ci since she can reduce
the incongruence cost while maintaining the same policy outcome. Therefore, cr must be the
effective pivotal legislator. Then, the above condition implies that voter r’s optimal choice
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is congruous voting, which results in that her representative becoming the unique new ef-
fective pivotal legislator whose ideal point is at vr. Consequently, for all voters whose ideal
points are greater than vr, the only way to change the effective pivotal legislator is to elect a
representative whose ideal point is less than vr, which is impossible by Lemma 2. Therefore,
there is no merit in incongruous voting for such voters, which establishes Lemma 5.
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we can conclude that all voters cast a congruous vote if
s0 /∈ [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]. Since all voters cast a congruous vote in this case, it
is clear that the equilibrium legislature will perfectly represent all voters’ ideal points. From
this reasoning, we can conclude as follows:
Proposition 1. If s0 /∈ [(1+
√
5)vl, vl)∪ (vr, (1+
√
5)vr], any equilibrium legislature inherits
the counterfactual baseline gridlock region as its gridlock region, that is, [vl, vr].
From Proposition 1, we see that the electoral process does not expand the size of the grid-
lock region if the status quo is too moderate or too extreme. Why do all voters cast a
congruous vote? It is because there is no incentive for voters to have the effective legislator.
The benefits of having the effective pivotal legislator are realized when the position of the
effective pivotal legislator affects the position of the policy outcome. However, the position
of the effective pivotal legislator does not have any influence on the policy outcome if the
status quo is too moderate or too extreme. As such, there is no way for voters to affect the
position of the policy outcome through incongruous voting. Moreover, incongruous voting
incurs costs. Hence, the only way for voters to maximize their utilities is to minimize the
cost of incongruence by congruous voting.


















Figure 2.1: The utility levels of voter r that correspond to the deviations c′r from cr = c
r.
2.4.2 Incongruous Voting and the Expansion of the Gridlock Re-
gion
We see that all voters cast a congruous vote if the status quo is not in the interval [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]. From this result, we may ask if all voters still cast a congruous
vote when the status quo is in the interval [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]. As a starting
point, we may check if the congruous voting of all voters constitutes an equilibrium legisla-
ture if s0 ∈ [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]. Suppose s0 > vr and ci = vi for all i. Then,
it is easy to see that ci = c
i for all i. In addition, assume that 2cr − s0 > 0 so that the
legislative outcome x is greater than 0. Recall that voter r’s payoff can be maximized if she
elects a representative whose ideal point is 2s0+3vr
5
. If (r+ 1)th legislator’s position is greater
than 2s0+3vr
5
, voter r has an incentive to deviate to 2s0+3vr
5
since her representative is still the
effective pivotal legislator, and, therefore, her deviation can effectively change the legislative
outcome to maximize her payoff. Hence, we see that congruous voting by all voters does not
constitute an equilibrium as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Then, does the deviation from cr to 2s0+3vr
5
that is depicted in Figure 2.1 constitute an
equilibrium? The answer is positive. If a voter whose ideal point is less than vr wants to
replace the effective pivotal legislator 2s0+3vr
5
, she must deviate by electing a representative
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whose ideal point is greater than 2s0+3vr
5
. However, this deviation by voter r − 1 pulls the
legislative outcome more toward the status quo, which is a worse outcome for her. Therefore,
incongruous voting is not optimal for such voters. Similarly, a voter whose ideal point is
greater than 2s0+3vr
5
can change the legislative outcome only via electing a representative
whose ideal point is less than 2s0+3vr
5
. However, this deviation results in the new legislative
outcome that is farther from her ideal point. Hence, we see that the effective pivotal legis-
lator’s ideal point must be greater than his district’s ideal point in an equilibrium.
Note that the above example is a special case of the equilibrium in which the effective
pivotal legislators are elected from the pivotal district. It is possible that the effective pivotal
district does not necessarily have the effective pivotal legislator in an equilibrium in a certain
configuration of the ideal points of electoral districts.15 However, we are not interested in
specifying all of the possible patterns of an equilibrium. Rather, we want to know whether
the gridlock region in any equilibrium is larger than the counterfactual baseline gridlock
region. Hence, it is necessary to identify the general features of an equilibrium legislature
when s0 ∈ [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]. If we can show that i) at least one voter votes
incongruously, ii) that the ideal point of the elected representative via incongruous voting
is greater than vr (or less than vl) in any equilibrium, and iii) the elected representative via
incongruous voting is always the effective pivotal legislator, then we can conclude that the





5)vr]. We can deduce some useful properties of an equilibrium
legislature as the following Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium legislature c∗ with s0 ∈ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr], the following prop-
erties hold.
15Also, it is possible that there exist multiple equilibria for a certain single configuration of the ideal points
of electoral districts. However, the finding that there exists at least one incongruous voter who expands the
gridlock region still holds in all the equilibria.
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(a) For all i such that vi ≤ 0, c∗i = vi,
(b) For all i such that vi ≥ s0 > 0, c∗i = vi,
(c) For all i such that s0 > vi > 0, vi ≤ c∗i ≤ 2s0+3vi5 ,
(d) For all i, vi 6= c∗i implies vi = cr∗,
(e) There exists at least one district such that vi 6= ci.
Similarly, in any equilibrium legislature c∗ with s0 ∈ [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl), the following properties
hold.
(a) For all i such that vi ≥ 0, c∗i = vi,
(b) For all i such that vi ≤ s0 < 0, c∗i = vi,
(c) For all i such that s0 < vi < 0, vi ≥ c∗i ≥ 2s0+3vi5 ,
(d) For all i, vi 6= c∗i implies vi = cl∗,
(e) There exists at least one district such that vi 6= ci.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 6 can be seen as an extension of the result in Klumpp (2010) to the pivotal
politics model. Lemma 6 (a) states that if the distance between a voter’s ideal point and the
status quo is greater than the distance between the median voter’s ideal point and the status
quo, then the voter casts a congruous vote. Part (b) is simply a restatement of Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 (c) states that voters never vote incongruously to elect a legislator more mod-
erate than themselves, as Lemma 2 states. Moreover, Lemma 6 (c) clearly sets the upper
bound of the range of possible deviation from voters’ ideal points. Lemma 6 (d) states that
a legislator who is elected by incongruous voting must be the effective pivotal legislator in
an equilibrium legislature. Incongruous voting is rational for them only when the gains in
policy outcome by doing so sufficiently compensate for the loss in the incongruence, which
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is possible only if incongruous voting leads voters to have the effective pivotal legislator.
Note that the converse of Lemma 6 (d) is not true. It is possible that more than one
legislator can be at the effective pivotal position when one legislator is elected by congruous
voting while the other is elected by incongruous voting. To see why, see Appendix.
Lemma 6 (e) clearly states that there exists at least one district that elects an extreme
legislator compared to the district’s ideal point. It is easy to see why Lemma 6 (e) holds.
If there is no extreme legislator, the positions of all legislators in an equilibrium legislature
will be the same as the positions of all districts’ ideal points. Thus, the effective pivotal
legislator will be a representative from district r. However, as I have already shown in Fig-




Note that the other pivotal legislator’s ideal point remains the same as in the counter-
factual baseline gridlock region that I identified in Proposition 1 (e.g., cl = vl if s0 > 0)
by Lemma 6 (a) and that the legislator who is elected via incongruous voting must be the
effective pivotal legislator by Lemma 6 (d). Hence, if the ideal point of the legislator who is
elected by incongruous voting is greater than vr, it is obvious that the gridlock region will
be wider than the one that I identified in the previous subsection.
It is easy to understand why cr > vr always holds. If all voters whose ideal points are less
than or equal to vr do not have an incentive to elect a legislator whose ideal point is greater
than vr, then c
r = vr is possible.
16 If so, however, voter r then has an incentive to elect
an extreme legislator whose ideal point lies in the interval (vr,min{2s0+3vr5 , vr+1}]. Hence,
cr = vr cannot hold in the equilibrium legislature. Next, c
r < vr is possible only when at
least one voter whose ideal point is greater than vr elects a representative whose ideal point
is less than vr. However, Lemma 2 states that this is impossible. Therefore, it must be that
16Note that Lemma 2 states that voters whose ideal points are greater than vr do not elect a legislator
whose ideal point is less than or equal to vr. Hence, we can safely rule out those voters from our consideration.
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cr > vr.
In conclusion, we see that the gridlock region when s0 ∈ [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl)∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr]
is wider than the counterfactual baseline gridlock region [vl, vr]. With these understandings,
we can reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 2. With other things being the same, the gridlock region in any equilibrium




5)vr] is wider than the counterfactual baseline
gridlock region [vl, vr] as a result of incongruous voting by at least one voter.
We see that the gridlock region is expanded compared to the counterfactual baseline
gridlock region. The reason is simple: If the status quo is either too moderate or too ex-
treme, the pivotal legislator is not, in fact, pivotal in the sense he cannot affect the legislative
outcome since the status quo cannot be replaced (too moderate status quo) or the legislative
outcome is to be at the median legislator’s ideal position (too extreme status quo). Hence,
there is no incentive for any voters to conduct costly incongruous voting to make their rep-
resentatives as the pivotal legislator. Conversely, if the status quo is neither too moderate
nor too extreme, the effective pivotal legislator is indeed pivotal in terms of determining the
policy outcome. Hence, the cost incurred by incongruence can be sufficiently compensated
by the policy benefits, and voters do not forgo this opportunity. Notice that supermajority
rule creates pivotal privilege. When voters can enjoy the pivotal privilege provided by the
supermajoritarian feature of the legislative process, their optimal choice is to make use of
this institutional opportunity to maximize their benefits. In sum, the expansion of the size
of the gridlock region is a consequence of individual voters’ rational behaviors when they are
given the opportunity.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
I have shown that voters bear some responsibility for the expansion of the gridlock region. If
there is an opportunity in which incongruous voting is profitable, the model shows that some
voters have incentive to do so at the expense of the expansion of the gridlock region, even
in the absence of partisan politics. More specifically, incongruous voting and the consequent
expansion of the gridlock region occurs if and only if the status quo is neither too moderate
nor too extreme. If it is too extreme, more than the supermajority agrees with the median
legislator’s proposal. If it is too moderate, more than the supermajority agrees not to change
the status quo. Following this sense, the interval of [(1 +
√
5)vl, vl) ∪ (vr, (1 +
√
5)vr] could
be termed as the opportunity region.
With this understanding in mind, one might ask how plausible it is that the status quo is
in the opportunity region. Based on the ample extant theoretical research that predicts that
the status quo falls in the opportunity region as a result of various causes, I expect that it
may not be unusual to encounter the status quo in the opportunity region. For example, a
nature-induced shock may move the status quo into the opportunity region over time (Cox
and McCubbins 2002, 2005). Similarly, the ideological configuration of voters can vary over-
time, which consequently shifts both the counterfactual baseline gridlock region [vl, vr] and
the opportunity region, as modeled by Krehbiel and Callander (2014). Hacker and Pierson
(2010a, 2010b) also present some real world instances of the change of the status quo policy
outcome caused by technical innovations or changes in demographics, which opens the pos-
sibility that the changed status quo policy outcome falls in the opportunity region. Krehbiel
et al. (2015) show that the equilibrium policy outcome can be in the opportunity region
as a result of agenda-based or resource-based partisan competition game with the existence
of the minority party with one chance for a proposal amendment or small endowment of
resources, although their model builds on partisan politics.
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Presidential unilateral action is another interesting and possible mechanism that yields
the status quo in the opportunity region. This is interesting in the sense that presidents can
tactically move the status quo into the opportunity region to expand the gridlock region for
their political ends. Indeed, moving the status quo by unilateral action such as executive
orders is one of presidents’ strongest legislative strategies and highly common in modern
American politics (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b). My model shows that the size of the
gridlock regions is affected by the position of the status quo, which implies that the position
of the effective pivotal legislator is determined by the position of the status quo through
the electoral process. Considering that the position of the pivotal legislator is crucial in
determining the position of the policy outcome, extreme presidents may use their unilateral
power to move the status quo into the opportunity region before elections in order for the
elected pivotal legislator to be much closer to their ideal points. This might be a venue for
future research in the context of the role of the electorate in inter-branch politics.17
It has been widely perceived that the ideological polarization of voters is likely to ex-
pand the gridlock region (Binder 2003). The mass polarization causes a wide opinion gap
among voters, and therefore a new policy that replaces the status quo is unlikely to pass
the legislative process (see Esteban and Ray 2011; Kahan 2010). I do not deny that the
ideological polarization of voters can cause the expansion of the gridlock region. This expan-
sion, which is directly caused by mass polarization, can be measured by the expansion of the
counterfactual baseline gridlock region [vl, vr]. My model shows that there is an additional
expansion caused by sophisticated voting that cannot be measured by the counterfactual
baseline gridlock region. The model also shows that the causality between the expansion of
17There are a few studies that focus on the role of the electorate in analyzing separation of powers (e.g.,
Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Nzelibe and Stephenson 2010; Stepheson and Nzelibe 2010; Howell and Won-
ton 2015). Most of these models focus on the role of the separation of powers in mitigating the asymmetric
information about the true preferences or competence level of presidents that exists between politicians and
the voters. In contrast, my model focuses on presidents’ possible strategic indirect manipulations of the








































Note: Each dot represents a different voter.
Figure 2.2: Ambiguous causality between mass polarization and sophisticated-voting-induced
expansion of the gridlock region (n = 15).
the gridlock region by sophisticated voting and mass polarization is ambiguous.
To understand the ambiguous causality, consider the case where the gap between two
polarized groups affects the size of the gridlock region, as shown in Figure 2.2. In this
case, each pivotal district belongs to a different polarized group. In this setting, as the gap
between two polarized groups becomes wider, each pivotal district’s ideal point gets more
extreme. As a result, the counterfactual baseline gridlock region expands as shown in Figure
2.2. However, the effect on the additional expansion of the gridlock region that sophisticated
voting causes is not clear. As shown in Figure 2.2, we see that the opportunity region on
both sides expands, which suggests that it would be more probable to have the status quo
in the opportunity region. However, note that the wording of “neither too moderate nor
too extreme” in the model is used to indicate to the relative position between the status
quo and both pivotal districts’ ideal points. Thus, any status quo in the opportunity region
must indeed be getting more extreme in an absolute sense when there is a sizable distance
between the two groups. If such an extreme status quo is rare in the real world, the overall
effect is ambiguous.
It is noteworthy that how much the gridlock expands by sophisticated voting is heavily
affected by the density of the distribution of voters. Specifically, I conjecture that high den-
sity tends to mitigate the degree of expansion of the gridlock region caused by sophisticated
voting. To see why, consider the following simple example. Suppose s0 > 0 and all voters
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whose ideal points are less than vr cast a congruous vote. If the density is not so high that
vr+1 ≥ 2s0+3vr5 , then the position of the effective pivotal voter is
2s0+3vr
5
. However, if the
density is so high that vr+1 <
2s0+3vr
5
, then the effective pivotal legislator’s position can
be located at 2s0+3vr
5
only if both voter r and voter r + 1 choose 2s0+3vr
5
at the same time,




means that coordination between r and r + 1 is required to attain the same gridlock as in




the coordination would be more difficult.
One interesting case of voter distribution is the following: the existence of two polarized
groups where the supermajority of voters belongs to one group, in which the counterfactual
gridlock region is in the supermajority group. The model then provides the following theoret-
ical prediction: the gridlock region is more likely to expand toward the minority group. It is
more likely that the status quo is located between the two groups, assuming that both groups
are sufficiently biased to each extreme. In particular, this tendency would be reinforced as
the gap between the groups becomes wider. As a result, the new policy outcome is more
likely to be pulled toward the supermajority group, which benefits solely the supermajority
group at the expense of the minority.
However, this case would be highly unusual in the real world. Rather, the more proba-
ble case is where there exist two groups where the majority group possess only one pivotal
district. In contrast to the previous case, the power of the minority group substantially in-
creases. In particular, we may imagine the extreme case where {v1, ..., vr−1} is the majority
group while {vr, vr+1, ..., vn} is the minority group. In this case, we see that the counter-
factual baseline gridlock region [vr, vl] effectively prevents passing any unfavorable policy
outcome for all voters in the minority group. In this regard, we may interpret this coun-
terfactual baseline gridlock region as the the bulwark against the tyranny of the majority




consequent expanded gridlock region by sophisticated voting favors the minority in two ways.
First, the policy outcome is much closer to the ideal points of all members of the minority
group than the one that would have been under congruous voting. Second, the expanded
gridlock region itself means that the range of policy that can be vetoed by the minority
group increased.
In fact, this reinforcement of minority power appears in the absence of mass polarization.
When the status quo is in the opportunity region, the new policy outcome takes out of the
utilities of most minority voters whose ideal points are more extreme than the status quo.
However, the interaction between supermajoritarianism and elections, even if we cannot tell
whether or not it is intentionally designed, gives the minority the reinforced power in return
by expanding the gridlock region toward the minority voters. This is a very interesting give
and take feature of politics that the model unearths. Furthermore, the model shows that
it is necessary to consider the effects from the interactions between institutional rules and
the role of electorate when we attempt to measure the power of the minority in legislative
politics.
Politicians are actors playing dysfunctional politics on the political stage. However, in
representative democracy, we should be well aware of the fact that the actors on the stage
have been selected by those off of the stage, i.e., voters.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose c is the Nash equilibrium legislature. Without loss of generality, assume that





i, v−i) > ui(ci, v−i) for all i. If vi ≥ s0, then by Lemma 3, the optimal choice for
i is ci = vi. If vi < s0, then there are three cases to be considered: i) ci = c
r, ii) ci > c
r, and
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iii) ci < c
r.
i) ci = c
r.
First, suppose that only one district chooses cr. If cr < vi ≤ cr+1, then c′i = vi ≤ cr+1,
which implies that district i is still pivotal. Since 2ci − s0 < 2c′i − s0 = 2vi − s0 < vi,
we see that −(vi − (ci − s0))2 < −(vi − (c′i − s0))2. Also, −(vi − ci)2 < −(vi − c′i)2 = 0.
Hence, ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) as required. If c




to being pivotal. Since 2ci − s0 < 2cr+1 − s0 < vi and −(vi − ci)2 < −(vi − c′i)2 = 0, we
see that ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) as required.
Second, suppose that more than one district choose cr. Choosing c′i instead of ci does
not change the equilibrium policy outcome since cr is still pivotal. However, −(vi− c′i)2
will be 0, which implies that ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) as required.
ii) ci > c
r
Choosing c′i instead of ci does not change the pivotal legislator c
r. Hence, the equilibrium
policy outcome is the same. However, choosing c′i minimizes the disutility from the
incongruence term, that is, −(vi−c′i)2 = 0. Therefore, ui(c′i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) as required.
iii) ci < c
r.
If ci < vi ≤ cr, choosing c′i does not change the equilibrium policy outcome but minimizes
the disutility from the incongruence term, that is, −(vi − c′i) = 0. Hence, ui(c′i, c−i) >
ui(ci, c−i) as required. Consider the case where ci < c





new pivotal legislator. Since 2cr − s0 < 2c′i − s0 < vi and −(vi − ci)2 < −(vi − c′i)2 = 0,
ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) as required.
In conclusion, ci < vi does not constitute the Nash equilibrium legislature when s0 > 0.
Similar logic can be applied to show that ci > vi does not constitute the Nash equilibrium
legislature when s0 < 0. 2
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Proof of Lemma 6
Without loss of generality, suppose s0 > vr. Recall that voter i’s utility function is
ui(ci, c−i) =

−(vi − 2cr + s0)2 − (vi − ci)2 if ci 6= cr,
−(vi − 2ci + s0)2 − (vi − ci)2 if ci = cr.
(a) Let c be a Nash equilibrium legislature. Note that cm ≥ 0 by Lemma 3. Hence all
equilibrium policy outcomes must be greater than or equal to 0. In addition, by Lemma
3, we know that ci ≥ vi for all i. Let i be any voter such that vi ≤ 0. Suppose ci > vi and
ci = c
r. Let c′i = vi. If voter i is still the effective pivotal legislator when she chooses c
′
i,
then it is obvious that ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i) since the new equilibrium policy outcome
is closer to vi than the old one and voter i minimizes the loss from the incongruence
term.
If voter i is not the effective pivotal legislator anymore when she chooses c′i, then it must
be that the new effective pivotal legislator’s ideal point is less than ci. Let c
r ′ denote
the new effective pivotal legislator. If vi ≥ cm, then the median legislator remains the
same. So, we see that max{2cr−s0, cm} ≥ max{2cr ′−s0, cm}, which means that the new
equilibrium policy is less than or equal to the old one and voter i can minimize the loss
from the incongruence term. Hence, ui(c
′
i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i). If ci < c
m, then the median
legislator is replaced by the new one such that cm′ < cm. Hence, max{2cr − s0, cm} >
max{2cr ′ − s0, cm′}, which means ui(c′i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i).
Now, suppose ci > vi and ci 6= cr. If ci < cr, then it is obvious that vi < cr. In
this case, the only way to be the new effective pivotal legislator is to elect an extreme
legislator whose ideal point is greater than cr. However, this yields the new equilibrium
policy outcome greater than or equal to the old equilibrium policy outcome. So, voter
i cannot gain additional benefits from the new equilibrium policy outcome while she
34
incurs the new additional loss from the incongruence term by doing so. Hence, voter i
never attempt to be the new effective pivotal legislator. If voter i chooses c′i then the
new equilibrium outcome remains the same if ci ≥ cm. If ci < cm, then cm′ < cm and
therefore max{2cr− s0, cm} > max{2cr ′− s0, cm′}. In both cases, ui(c′i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i).
Consider the case where ci > c




or c′i < c
r ′. However, c′i = c
r ′ is possible only when there exist at least r − 1 legislators
whose ideal points are less than 0, which means that at least r− 1−m > 0 conservative
voters must elect a legislator whose ideal point is less than theirs. Lemma 3 states it
is impossible in any Nash equilibrium legislature. So, the remaining case is c′i < c
r. If
ci < c
m then c′i < c
m therefore cm = cm′. Also, cr = cr ′. Hence, the equilibrium policy
outcome remains the same. Hence, c′i is optimal for voter i since she can minimize the
loss from the incongruence term while have the same equilibrium policy outcome.
If ci ≥ cm, then cm = cm′ only when c′i > cm. If so, the equilibrium outcome remains
the same but she can minimize the loss from the incongruence term. So, ui(c
′
i, c−i) >
ui(ci, c−i). Finally, if ci > c
m and c′i < c
m, then cm′ < cm. Then, max{2cr − s0, cm} ≥
max{2cr ′ − s0, cm′}. Hence, ui(c′i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i). In conclusion, we see that c′i = vi is
the unique strict dominant strategy. 2
(b) It follows from Lemma 2. 2
(c) Let c be a Nash equilibrium legislature. Lemma 3 states that, for all i, ci ≥ vi. Part
(b) states that ci = vi if vi ≥ s0 > 0. So, we wish to show the upper bound of ci
for all i such that 0 < vi < s0. Suppose ci = c
r and 0 < vi < s0. Suppose ci = vi.
Let c′i > vi. If ci = c
r, voter i has an incentive to elect an extreme legislator as long
as ui(c
′
i, c−i) ≥ ui(ci, c−i). This condition holds only if c′i ≤ 4s0+vi5 . Also, voter i can













still remains as the effective pivotal legislator. If cr+1 < 2s0+3vi
5
, c′i = c
r+1 improves her
utility since c′i ≤ 4s0+vi5 . So, for all i such that ci = c




Now, suppose that ci < c
r and cr ≥ s+vi
2
. Then, there is no incentive for voter i to be
the new equilibrium pivotal legislator since the new equilibrium policy outcome will be
farther from her ideal point. Hence, the optimal choice for voter i is to elect ci = vi
since she can minimize her loss from the incongruence term while the equilibrium policy
outcome remains the same.
Suppose instead that ci < c
r and cr < s0+vi
2
. Note that voters attempt to be the new
effective pivotal legislator only when the utility from doing so is better than the utility
from not doing it. Hence, we assume here that being pivotal is better for voter i. It
is obvious that i will not choose ci >
s0+vi
2
even if there does not exist cr+1 between
cr and s0+vi
2
. Since ci >
s0+vi
2
, the equilibrium policy outcome will be greater than vi.
Let x denote this equilibrium policy outcome. However, if voter i chooses c′i <
s0+vi
2
that produces the equilibrium policy outcome denoted by x′ such that x′ < vi and
|vi−x′| = |x−vi|, it is clear that ui(c′i, c−i) > ui(ci, c−i). Hence, it must be that ci ≤ s0+vi2 .








− s0 ≤ cm. This
case happens only when vi ≤ cm. Since cr < s0+vi2 , it follows then that 2c
r − s0 ≤ cm
which implies that the equilibrium policy outcome is cm. So, voter i’s optimal choice is
ci = vi.
If cr ≤ s0+vi
2
, then voter i will choose min{2s0+3vi
5
, cr+1} to maximize her utility. If
cr < 2s0+3vi
5
, then optimal choice for voter i is to elect an extreme legislator whose ideal
point is as close to cr as possible since ui increases as the gap between her legislator and
2s0+3vi
5
decreases. Hence, this case does not constitute the Nash equilibrium legislature.
In conclusion, we see that the upper bound of ci for all i is
2s0+3vi
5
and the lower bound
is vi in the Nash equilibrium legislature. 2
(d) Let c be a Nash equilibrium legislature. Let i be a voter such that ci 6= vi. Suppose that
36
ci 6= cr. By Lemma 3, it must be that ci > vi. It is either vi < ci < cr, or cr < vi ≤ ci,
or vi < c
r < ci. If ci < c
r, then ci = vi is the optimal choice for i since she can improve
her utility by minimizing the loss from the incongruence term while facing the same
equilibrium outcome. If cr < vi ≤ ci, then ci = vi is the optimal choice by the same
reason. Finally, if vi < c
r < ci, she can get better outcome by choosing ci = c
r since
the equilibrium outcome remains the same while she can minimize the loss from the
incongruence term. Then i is pivotal, a contradiction. This completes the proof. 2
(e) Let c be a Nash equilibrium legislature. Suppose ci = c
r for all i. Then c is an order
preserving Nash equilibrium legislature. Since vi 6= vj for all i 6= j by assumption, voter
r can improve her utility by choosing min{3s0+2vi
5
, cr+1}. 2
Claim: the converse of Lemma 6 (d) is not true.
Suppose all voters whose ideal points are not vr or vr+1 cast a congruous vote but voter




vr+1 < cr =
2s0+3vr
5
< vr+2. If voter r + 1 elects cr+1 = cr, then both representatives from
district r and r + 1 are the effective pivotal legislator and the legislative outcome will be x.
If, instead, voter r+1 casts a congruous votes (i.e., c′r+1), her representative will be the single
effective pivotal legislator and the legislative outcome will be x′. Note that the benefits voter
r+ 1 obtains via deviating from cr+1 to c
′
r+1 is |cr− vr+1| while her loss is |x− x′|. Since her
loss is clearly larger than the benefits (see (a) in Figure 8), cr+1 strictly dominates c
′
r+1. Of
course, voter r+ 1 would not elect a representative whose ideal point is greater than cr since
a representative from district r will be the single effective pivotal legislator and therefore
the legislative outcome will remain the same at x while the distance between voter r + 1
and her representative increases. Therefore, the optimal choice for voter r + 1 is cr+1 = cr.


















Figure 2.3: Two examples of multiple legislators at the effective pivot.
If vr+1 = cr =
2s0+3vr
5
< vr+2, the only way for voter r + 1 to change the legislative
outcome is to elect a representative whose ideal point is less than cr. However, Lemma 2
states that this is impossible. Hence, the optimal choice for voter r + 1 is congruous voting
as depicted in (b) in Figure 8. In this case, there are two legislators at the effective pivot but
only one legislator (i.e., a representative from district r) is elected via incongruous voting.
2
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Chapter 3. Presidential Unilateral
Action as a Tool of Voter Mobilization
3.1 Introduction
Since the work by Neustadt (1960), presidential power has been understood as the power to
persuade the other government branches in the checks and balances system. However, we
have seen the rise of the presidency with “power without persuasion” (Mayer 2001; Howell
2003). The ambiguity of the Constitution and the rise of the administrative state together
lead to the rise of presidents relying on unilateral power (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b).
Many scholars now argue that the checks and balances system is imperiled with the rise of
the “imperial presidency” that exceeds its constitutional limits (Schlesinger 1973; Rudale-
vige 2005; Savage 2007).
Members of Congress lambaste the abuse of executive power. However, effective congres-
sional action to overturn the president’s unilateral initiative rarely occurs (Rudalevige 2005;
Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b). In fact, Congress is afflicted with several inherent prob-
lems that hinder it from constraining the unilateral presidency: information asymmetries,
collective action problems, transaction costs, and gridlock caused by the supermajoritarian
legislative process (Krehbiel 1998; Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b; Epstein and O’Halloran
1999; Levinson 2005). Courts also ineffectively constrain the unilateral presidency. Howell
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(2003) found that courts rarely rule that presidents exceed the extent that Congress allows.
Moreover, courts are also afflicted with several inherent problems that disrupt proper over-
sight over the executive: information asymmetries and collective action problems (Komesar
1994; Calabresi 2002; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Fallon 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006; Posner and
Vermeule 2007).
Given this weak checks and balances system, it is natural to expect that presidents can
invoke unilateral power whenever they desire certain outcomes. However, they do not al-
ways rely on unilateral power. They sometimes decide not to unilaterally act, or they choose
an unsatisfactory compromise. One example is President Clinton’s “don’t ask, don’t tell”
(DADT) policy. He could have unilaterally acted to end the military policy that excludes
homosexuals from service and was willing to end this policy. However, he was reluctant
to use unilateral power to take an aggressive step and instead introduced a compromise
that prohibits military personnel from discriminating against homosexual military members,
while still excluding homosexuals from service. In another example, President Obama did
not issue an executive order to establish the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
policy until 2012, although he could have done so much earlier.
What deters the president from initiating unilateral action? To investigate this question,
Posner and Vermeule (2010) focused on the role of “public constraints,” which can indepen-
dently constrain the unilateral presidency even if there are no effective checks and balances
from other branches (see also Baum 2004; Kriner and Schickler 2016). The problem is that
how public opinion is constructed and constrains the unilateral presidency is still a “myste-
rious process” (Posner and Vermeule 2010, 77).
Recently, several scholars have begun to investigate this, but the mystery appeared to
become more puzzling, as they found seemingly contradictory results. Reeves and Rogowski
(2016, 2018) present empirical evidence that voters’ constitutional concerns automatically
activate their negative evaluations of presidential unilateral action, which suggests that pres-
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idents might suffer at the ballot box if they implement unilateral action. However, Christen-
son and Kriner (2017a) showed that the constraints from “constitutional qualms”18 are not
automatic but are subject to voters’ partisanship, which suggests that presidents can invoke
their unilateral power if there are sufficient voters who would support the policy implemented
by unilateral action.
As Christenson and Kriner (2017a) correctly indicated, these two results are different par-
tial portraits of the whole picture. As such, it is imperative to have a theory that presents the
whole picture of a president’s reasoning on unilateral action. The purpose of this paper is to
theorize how public opinion constrains the unilateral presidency in the absence of checks and
balances from other branches. More specifically, I focus on elections as institutional conduits
in which public opinion can force the president to commit to the principle of the separation
of powers even when checks and balances from other branches are very weak or practically
absent. Understanding such a role of elections enables us not only to identify when the
public opinion successfully constrains the president’s unilateral action but also to recognize
the strategy of Congress that attempts to indirectly constrain the president by constructing
a political environment in which presidential unilateral action is deterred, instead of relying
on the weak institutional channel of checks and balances.
There are many ways presidents can act unilaterally.19 However, not all presidential
unilateral actions lead voters to find them controversial in terms of constitutionality. For
example, President Obama’s executive order to change the logo of the Peace Corps in 2014
did not cause constitutional controversy among voters; furthermore, most voters were not
even aware of the executive order. Hence, the necessary conditions for the president’s uni-
18I use “constitutional qualms” to represent voters’ propensity to disapprove of presidents’ unilateral
lawmaking bypassing the legislature. The reason behind the use of this term is the Constitution that
stipulates that lawmaking power is bestowed to the legislature. Therefore, we see that voters’ negative
view on unilateral presidency can be traced back to their uneasiness with the violation of the constitutional
principle.
19For example, executive orders, proclamations, administrative and national security directives, military
orders, pardons, recess appointments, signing statements, and executive agreements (see Cooper 2002).
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lateral move to be constrained by public opinion are that 1) the constitutional grounds of
the unilateral action are disputable, and 2) that the unilateral action is highly visible to
voters due to its controversial constitutionality. The focus of my model is on the instances
of unilateral actions that satisfy these necessary conditions.20
In addition to unilateral action, the president may appeal to the public using non-
unilateral policymaking tools, such as public speeches or legislative proposals. Although
when the president prefers unilateral action over such non-unilateral policymaking tools is
beyond the scope of this paper, I note that these non-unilateral policymaking tools provide
smaller expressive benefits of voting than unilateral action. Non-unilateral policymaking
tools do not incur the cost from activating voters’ and the president’s constitutional qualms.
However, this low cost weakens the credibility of the president’s message that he or she cares
about voters because voters know that the president can establish a policy by unilateral
action. Thus, if the president abstains from unilateral action to establish a policy, voters
can infer that the policy is not important enough for the president to burden the cost. For
example, President Obama’s reluctance to initiate unilateral action on immigration policy
was interpreted by Hispanic voters as his lack of attention to them (Schier 2011).
Although there are several formal models that investigate the effects of elections on the
president’s strategic behavior (e.g., Persson et al. 1997; Groseclose and McCarty 2001;
Stephenson and Nzelibe 2010; Fox and Stephenson 2011; Judd 2017; Howell and Wolton
2018), these models focus on the informational asymmetries between the president and a
single representative voter and the role of the separation of powers in dispelling voters’
uncertainty about the president.21 Therefore, public opinion is not a constraint but a conse-
20Although which instances of unilateral actions will satisfy these necessary conditions are beyond the scope
of this paper, my model below suggests that most instances of unilateral actions will meet these conditions
when the opponents against the unilateral action exist in terms of either policy grounds or constitutional
grounds or both, and they made its constitutional problems sufficiently visible to voters in an attempt to
frustrate the unilateral action.
21Informational asymmetries come from the assumption that voters do not know the president’s preferences
or the state of the world. In contrast, I assume in my model that voters know the president’s true preferences.
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quence that the separation of powers provides by informing the representative voter, who is
pivotal in deciding the electoral outcome, of whether the president is desirable. Furthermore,
the assumption of a single pivotal representative voter in these models does not show the
mobilizing effect of unilateral action due to the simple fact that the representative voter
cannot abstain. In my model, however, unilateral action is considered the president’s direct
attempt to construct a pivotal representative voter who supports the president by mobiliz-
ing his or her supporters. For this purpose, I focus on setting a heterogeneous electorate in
the absence of a checks and balances system, which allows us to consider when presidential
unilateral action can successfully mobilize supporters to ensure re-election. As I will show
below, whether such mobilizations will realize the president’s plan depends on the given
public opinion. This approach enables us to examine not only the direct constraining effects
of public opinion on the president’s unilateral action but also possible benign effects of uni-
lateral action on representative democracy that I will discuss below.
The question is then how the president can make his or her supporters pivotal by ini-
tiating unilateral action. I apply a model of expressive benefits of voting (see Riker and
Ordeshook 1968) in a large election to answer this question, which is the key departure of
my theory from the previous literature. The basic intuition is that presidential unilateral ac-
tion increases some supporters’ expressive benefits of voting, which, in turn, leads them to be
more likely to turn out on election day. However, presidential unilateral action also increases
the cost of voting by activating voters’ concerns about constitutional qualms, which leads
voters to be less likely to turn out. Based on the net of mobilizing and demobilizing effects
of unilateral action, the president decides whether to unilaterally act. To my knowledge, my
In addition, there is no asymmetric information regarding the state of the world. However, I show that voters
still can constrain presidential power. I admit that this assumption might implicitly exclude a foreign or
military policy dimension from my analysis because presidents have a firm authority to unilaterally act in
this type of policy dimension due to their informational advantages (see Canes-Wrone et al. 2008; Howell et
al. 2013). In this sense, my model implicitly follows the “two presidencies” thesis (see Dahl 1950; Wildavsky
1966; Canes-Wrone 2008).
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model is the first attempt to investigate the supply side of the expressive benefits of voting
in the context of presidential unilateral action.
Regarding the mobilizing effects, the president’s unilateral action can be a useful tool for
appealing to some voters by increasing voters’ expressive benefits of voting.22 In a large elec-
tion, voters are likely to vote according to their expressive benefits rather than their policy
preferences because the probability that everyone’s single vote will be pivotal in determin-
ing the electoral outcome is very small (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Tullock 1971; Brennan
and Buchanan 1984; Scheussler 2000, Feddersen and Sandroni 2006a, 2006b; Fowler 2006;
Feddersen et al. 2009). In particular, Fowler (2006) and Feddersen et al. (2009) found that
individuals vote for a candidate who seems to be doing the right thing in their view, even
if they do not expect their votes to be a pivotal. In line with this approach, I propose that
voters enjoy expressive benefits of voting for a candidate who advocates and establishes the
right policy in their view. Based on this demand side of the expressive benefits of voting, I
examine the supply side of the expressive benefits of voting by positing that the president
can at least send a message to some voters that the president is doing the right thing by
establishing a policy through unilateral power, which increases the expressive benefits of
voting for a certain subset of voters.
The mobilizing effects primarily derive from the extra expressive benefits of voting of the
subset of the supporters targeted by the president’s unilateral action rather than those of
all supporters. The partisan expressive benefits of all supporters from voting for their co-
partisan candidate are already reflected in their initial level of expressive benefits of voting
in my model. In other words, Republican voters receive partisan expressive benefits of vot-
ing if they vote for an incumbent Republican president regardless of whether the president
initiates unilateral action. Hence, the initial partisan expressive benefits can be interpreted
22The president can easily appeal to the audience to accomplish what he or she desires as a primary agenda
setter in a nation (Canes-Wrone 2001a, 2001b; Kernell 2006).
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as voters’ partisan loyalty. It is well known that the effect of partisanship on voters’ final
vote is dominant and stable (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2000; Green et al. 2002). In
addition to this partisan loyalty, presidential unilateral action on a certain policy provides
extra expressive benefits of voting to those supporters who deeply care about the policy.
Such a presidential strategy of targeting particular constituencies is consistent with previous
studies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Rottinghaus and Warber 2015; Kriner and Reeves
2015, 2016). Therefore, the president may use unilateral power to mobilize potentially piv-
otal supporters rather than to steal the opposing voters to increase the odds of electoral
victory.
The demobilizing effects of presidential unilateral action derive from voters’ constitu-
tional qualms (Reeves and Rogowski 2016, 2018) that lead voters to be reluctant to vote for
the president who seemingly violates the principle of the separation of powers. In contrast
to the mobilizing effects, the demobilizing effects occur across all supporters.
In summary, the president faces a trade-off regarding the exercise of unilateral action. Es-
tablishing a policy will be helpful for re-election in its own right but the instrument by which
the policy is established (i.e., unilateral action) is costly because it activates voters’ consti-
tutional qualms. Hence, given a policy, the president will decide whether to act unilaterally
to establish the policy or not according to the current magnitude of voters’ constitutional
qualms. As such, my model shows that the magnitude of voters’ constitutional qualms is the
primary variable that determines whether the president will seek a particular policy through
unilateral action given the size of the group that the policy targets and the importance of
the policy to the target group.
In addition, my model contributes to the literature by showing that observationally equiv-
alent presidential decisions on unilateral actions originate from different motivations. On one
hand, the president may act unilaterally to establish his or her preferred policy, although the
unilateral action is not crucial to ensure electoral victory, which I call plebiscitary motiva-
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tion. On the other hand, the president may take unilateral action because he or she cannot
win the election without it, which I call particularistic motivation. My model shows that
the motivation of the president’s unilateral action varies according to whether the existing
political landscape is friendly or hostile to the president’s re-election prospects. Plebisci-
tary motivation arises in the friendly political landscape while the hostile political landscape
yields particularistic motivation. Without a theory, it is hard to recognize these qualitatively
different natures of motivations because the behavioral results in both cases are observation-
ally equivalent: the president’s engagement in unilateral action.
These results call for a more careful interpretation of unilateral action. The foremost con-
cerns about presidential unilateral action are that it lacks constitutional legitimacy. However,
in the case of the plebiscitary motivation that can occur in a friendly political landscape, it is
possible to consider that the unilateral action acquires a different type of legitimacy through
popular support expressed as the electoral victory after unilateral action. Considering that
the primary reason the president acts unilaterally is to establish the president’s preferred pol-
icy, since the president could have won the election without unilateral action, the president
in this case appears to be what Weber calls the plebiscitary leader who “will act according
to his own judgment as long as he can successfully claim [the voters’] confidence” (Mommsen
1984, 184). Moreover, it is possible to argue that such a president’s freedom in policymaking
allows the president to exercise unilateral powers to establish a policy that is unpopular
among voters but appropriate according to the president’s judgment (see Canes-Wrone and
Shotts 2004). I point out that such legitimacy from popular support can compensate for the
lack of constitutional legitimacy, which can be solid grounds for the affirmative view on the
president’s unilateral policymaking power (e.g., see Howell and Moe 2016).
In the case of the particularistic motivation that the president acts unilaterally to avoid
electoral defeat, which can occur in a hostile political landscape, the president appears to
be the particularistic leader (see Kriner and Reeves 2015) in the sense that the president
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unilaterally acts to establish a policy that is favored by only a particular subset of the sup-
porters to avoid the anticipated electoral defeat. On its face, this particularistic unilateral
action has normatively negative implications because, in addition to the lack of constitu-
tionality, this particularistic motivation may lead the president to establish a policy through
unilateral action, although the president does not believe that the policy is the right one.
However, at the same time, this particularistic motivation can be a remedy for the tyranny
of the majority in the sense that a minority group’s preferred policy can be implemented by
unilateral action if the minority group can play the role of pivotal voters.
Overall, my model points out possible grounds for affirmative normative views on pres-
idential unilateral action that have been neglected in previous studies that have analyzed
unilateral action in isolation from electoral constraints. The president’s decision regarding
whether to act unilaterally depends on popular support because popular support of voters
through an election provides an alternative legitimacy for the president’s unilateral action
that may compensate for the lack of constitutional legitimacy. Whether the president’s uni-
lateral action acquires ex-post approval by popular support depends on the magnitude of
voters’ constitutional qualms. If voters’ weak constitutional qualms represent the voters’
despair toward the Constitution that causes a political stalemate and dysfunction in the
policymaking process,23 then it is possible to interpret that unilateral action reflects voters’
choices to fix a problem over to protect the Constitution. I admit that whether unilateral
action provides benign or malign consequences on our democracy depends on the type of
president and whether the claim of the target group is seeking important democratic values
or narrow special interests. However, what I try to emphasize here is that such inconclu-
siveness implies that unilateral action does not necessarily provide a harmful outcome to
our democracy, which shows that it is unfair to normatively criticize unilateral action solely
23Howell and Moe (2016) claim that the constitution is the predominant culprit that causes political dys-
function and proposes to reform the constitution by bringing the president to the center of the policymaking
process.
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based on constitutional grounds. I hope my model ignites a lively debate on the multifaceted
normative implications of unilateral action for our democracy.
3.2 The Model
There are two candidates, L and R. Without loss of generality, I assume that the incum-
bent president is L. Let x ∈ {xR, xL} be a policy that L can choose, where xR denotes
R’s preferred policy and xL denotes L’s preferred policy. I assume that xR is the status
quo. At the beginning of the first period, L must decide whether to act unilaterally to set a
policy xL. After L’s decision, the presidential election is held based on the plurality rule.
24
After the election, the second period begins with the elected or re-elected president. The
new president can move unilaterally to replace a status quo xR with xL if xR is the policy
outcome in the first period, or the president can unilaterally revoke xL to the original status
quo xR if xL is the policy outcome in the first period. There is no election in the second
period, and the game ends.
Following the conventional understanding in the literature, I propose that the president
wants to leave a policy legacy. The president can enjoy any policy legacy only if the policy
established by unilateral action survives in the second period. Let λ ∈ R++ denote the
president’s benefits from leaving a policy legacy. Note that the policy established by L’s
unilateral action is vulnerable to the risk of the future president’s revocation if R wins the
election. There are two ways for L to leave a policy legacy. On one hand, L receives λ if L
unilaterally establishes xL and L wins the election in the upcoming election. On the other
hand, if L does not unilaterally act in the first period and L wins the election, then L can act
unilaterally in the second period to establish xL and L receives δλ, where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the president’s discount factor.
24For simplicity, I assume a simple plurality election rule without any role of the electoral college.
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Let QP ∈ R++ denote the cost incurred by unilateral action. One intuition behind this
cost is that the president wants to be remembered as a skillful leader who was able to make a
policy through the congressional legislation process as stipulated in the Constitution. There
are several anecdotes showing that the president considers the reputational cost of a unilat-
eral action when the president makes a decision. For example, President Obama’s comments
clearly illustrate that presidents are not completely free from constitutional anxiety originat-
ing from executive unilateral actions. Speaking of his inaction on immigration, he said: “The
idea of doing things on my own is very tempting. [...] But that’s not how our system works.
That’s not how our democracy functions. That’s not how our Constitution is written” (The
White House 2011).
This cost may reflect that the president does not want to undermine constitutional prin-
ciples by unilateral action.25 For example, President Jefferson hesitated to purchase French
Louisiana despite the necessity of an urgent decision because he did not believe that the
Constitution confers the necessary power to do it. One of Jefferson’s letters shows the con-
stitutional trouble he found himself in: “Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written
Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction [...] I confess, then, I think
it important, in the present case, to set an example against broad construction by appealing
for new power to the people.”26
The president is also office-motivated. When the president wins the election, the pres-
ident receives a payoff W ∈ R++, whereas the president receives nothing if the president
loses the election. Finally, if λ − QP ≤ 0, then the president never unilaterally acts except
25If we consider the constitution a coordination device of society, then the presidents’ constitutional qualms
can be interpreted as their concerns of miscoordination that can be caused by presidents’ violation of con-
stitutional principles. The reason that the constitution can play a coordination role is that each member of
a society expects the other members to abide by constitutional principles. However, if presidents who are
the most visible and influential figures in politics move unilaterally, this violation of constitutional principles
leads members of society to expect that constitutional principles are not upheld by everyone; thus, the Con-
stitution loses its focal power, which can cause miscoordination. I view that this concern for miscoordination
constitutes a micro-foundation of voters’ constitutional qualms. See McAdams (2015) for more details.
26Thomas Jefferson. 1803. To Wilson Cary Nicholas Monticello, September 7.
49
for one special case.27 I assume λ−QP > 0 throughout the paper, unless stated otherwise.
In addition, it is clear that L does not have any incentive to revoke xL in the second period
when xL is the policy outcome in the first period. Moreover, L will replace xR with xL if the
policy outcome is xR and L wins the election in the first period. Hence, L’s utility function
assumes the following form:
UP =

λ−Qp +W if L acts unilaterally and wins the election,
δ(λ−Qp) +W if L does not act unilaterally and wins the election,
−Qp if L acts unilaterally and loses the election,
0 if L does not act unilaterally and loses the election.
Note that whether unilateral action is profitable for the president depends on the electoral
outcome, which is dependent on voters’ calculus of voting. Thus, let us turn to voters.
There are two sets of voters: VL representing a set of voters supporting L, and VR
representing a set of voters supporting R. In addition, there is a proper subset of VL,
denoted by SL, that consists of supporters who receive more expressive benefits from policy
xL than other voters in VL.
28 I use the following notation to denote the number of voters in




with empirical evidence that partisan voters abstain rather than vote for the candidate of
the other party (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), I assume that every voter
must decide whether to vote for the candidate they supports or abstain at the end of the
first period.
There are two types of expressive benefits of voting. First, for any voter i, there are
27Below, I show that the president may take unilateral action to win the election even though the president
prefers the status quo.
28For example, Hispanic voters are this kind of subgroup in the context of Obama’s recent unilateral action
on immigration policy.
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expressive benefits of voting from voters’ partisan loyalty, denoted by Gi ∈ R++, which
materialize only if i votes for the co-partisan candidate. If the voter abstains, the voter
receives 0. Second, if the president unilaterally acts to set a policy targeting SL, for any voter
i in SL, voter i receives an additional expressive utility from voting, denoted by di ∈ R++
when voter i votes for L.29
Let Ci ∈ R denote the net cost of voting for voter i, which means the subtraction of
all other positive expressive benefits of voting (e.g., civic duty) other than voters’ partisan
loyalty and extra expressive benefits of voting provided by presidential unilateral action
from the total cost of voting. For any voter i, Ci is independently and identically drawn
from a common distribution with full support whose cumulative distribution function F is
continuous and strictly increasing. L knows only the distribution. Voting for a president who
acts unilaterally activates voters’ constitutional qualms, which incurs the same additional
cost of voting, denoted by Q ∈ R++, for all i regardless of i’s partisanship.
I assume that the values of Gi are the same for the members of each set VL and VR. For
notational convenience, let Gi = GL if i ∈ VL and Gi = GR if i ∈ VR. Similarly, all members
of SL share the same dL. Although this assumption is strong, it makes the model simple
and tractable to show my basic argument. These parameters are known to the president. I
also assume that there are enough voters in both VL and VR to guarantee the law of large
numbers.
Although voters receive some benefits from placing their favorite candidate in office, I
omit the terms for the benefits because it does not play an important role in voters’ expected
29It is possible that the president’s unilateral action may inspire R supporters to turn out to vote for R.
In the appendix, I show that the substantive conclusion from my model still holds even if these scenarios are
incorporated into the model. The main effect of the addition of the counter-mobilization of R supporters is to
increase the minimally required turnout rate of L supporters for L to win the election. However, the intuition
behind the results from such an effect is well captured in my model by separating the friendly and the hostile
political landscape, which is a much simpler way to follow. Indeed, adding the counter-mobilization of R
supporters is nothing more than to define the friendly and the hostile political landscape in a more complex
way. For more detail, see the appendix.
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payoffs in large elections in which the probability that each voter’s vote will be pivotal in
determining the winner is very small, with almost zero probability in a large election. For
simplicity, I assume that the pivotal probability is 0. Finally, the game proceeds as follows:
1. Period 1.
i. L decides whether to act unilaterally to establish a policy xL or maintain xR.
ii. Ci are drawn and voters choose their actions in the election.
2. Period 2.
i. The (re)elected president in period 1 decides whether to keep the policy outcome of
the first period or change it.
ii. Payoffs are realized and the game ends.
3.3 Profitable Unilateral Action
Since cross-voting of voters is excluded in the model, the voters’ options are reduced to
whether to vote for their co-partisan candidate or to abstain, which enables us to make use
of the basic idea of expressive theories of voting. According to expressive voting models,
voters vote if and only if the benefits from voting are greater than the costs of voting. Then,
the probability that voter i will turn out is
Pr(turnout)i =

F (GL −Q) if i ∈ VL\SL and L acts unilaterally,
F (GL + dL −Q) if i ∈ SL and L acts unilaterally,
F (GL) if i ∈ VL and L does not act unilaterally,
F (GR) if i ∈ VR.
(3.1)
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Recall that there are many voters so that the law of large numbers is guaranteed. Hence,
each group’s expected voter turnout rate conditional on the president’s unilateral action, is
denoted by tVL\SL , tSL , tVL , and tR, which follows from (3.1):
30
tVL\SL = F (GL −Q) when L unilaterally acts,
tSL = F (GL + dL −Q) when L unilaterally acts,
tVL = tVL\SL = tSL = F (GL) when L does not act unilaterally,
tVR = F (GR) regardless of L’s action.
For L’s unilateral action to be profitable, it must guarantee L’s winning in the election
because losing the election deprives L of not only W but also λ since the elected R will change
the policy from xL to xR in the second period, which produces a negative payoff, −QP . This
is worse than the case in which L does not unilaterally act and loses the election, which gives
0 to L. Let t′VL denote the expected turnout rate of L supporters after L’s unilateral action,
such that t′VL = stSL + (1 − s)tVL\SL . Note that, from (3.1), t
′
VL
is a function of Q,GL, dL
and s such that t′VL : R++ × R++ × R++ × (0, 1)→ (0, 1). Since I assume the plurality rule,
L wins if and only if t′VLvL ≥ tVRvR. In addition, it is clear that δ(λ − Qp) < λ − Qp when
L’s unilateral action guarantees L’s winning in the election. Hence, L will initiate unilateral
action as long as the unilateral action secures L’s winning, as Lemma 1 states.
Lemma 1: Let t′VL denote the expected turnout rate of L’s supporters after L’s unilat-
eral action such that t′VL = stSL + (1− s)tVL\SL. The president takes unilateral action if and
only if t′VLvL ≥ tVRvR.
30Rigorously speaking, this holds only if the number of voters is infinite. However, for tractability, I
assume that the president follows this reasoning as an approximated voter turnout rate estimation. This
assumption might be interpreted as a sort of bounded rationality of the president. A similar usage of law of
large numbers can be found in Morris and Shin (2002).
53
Our focus then moves to when L’s unilateral action guarantees winning. If L’s uni-




It could be either t′VL < tVL or t
′
VL
≥ tVL . However, identifying the direction of the change
post-unilateral action turnout rate of L supporters is not sufficient to know the consequent
electoral outcome because the electoral outcome also depends on the type of the political
landscape. There are two types of political landscape. First, L expects to win the election
even without taking unilateral action, that is, tVLvL ≥ tVRvR. I call this environment a
friendly political landscape. Second, L expects to lose the election, that is, tVLvL < tVRvR.
I call this case a hostile political landscape.
3.3.1 Friendly Political Landscape
There are two factors that construct the friendly political landscape: a higher turnout rate
of L supporters (i.e., tVL ≥ tVR) or the larger size of L supporters (i.e., vL ≥ vR) (or
both). By Lemma 1, L would unilaterally act as long as L’s unilateral action does not
change the expected electoral victory. For this reason, L needs to calculate the net effect
of unilateral action on the turnout rate of L supporters. There are three possible sub-cases
in this scenario: (i) vL = vR, (ii) vL > vR, and (iii) vL < vR. In what follows, I will show
that the effectiveness of voters’ constitutional qualms in constraining unilateral action varies
according to the relative size of vL and vR because the minimum winning turnout rate of L
supporters for L to win is determined by it, as described in Figure 3.1.
As a benchmark, let us examine the first sub-case (i.e., vL = vR). Let m denote the
minimum winning turnout rate of L supporters, that is, m = vR
vL
tVR . Since vR = vL, L wins
the election as long as tVL is at least as great as tVR , which implies m = tVR . Since I assume
that L wins the election, it must be tVL ≥ m = tVR . Lemma 1 implies the following condition
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s ≥ F (GR)− F (GL −Q)
F (GL −Q+ dL)− F (GL −Q)
. (3.3)
If tVL\SL ≥ m, then the right-hand side of (3.2) becomes non-positive,32 which implies
L always acts unilaterally since s ∈ (0, 1). Rewriting this condition with respect to F , it is
easy to see that this case happens when Q ≤ GL − GR. Additionally, GL − GR is always
non-negative because tVL ≥ m = tVR implies GL ≥ GR. Regardless of the size of the target
voters s and the target voters’ post-unilateral action turnout rate t′SL , (3.2) always holds,
which implies that L’s unilateral action is unconstrained. It is because the partisan expres-
sive benefits of L supporters (i.e., GL) are so high that it is still possible for L to win the
election with votes from only L supporters who do not receive any extra benefits but only
are disappointed by the unilateral action. In other words, L does not need to mobilize SL
by unilateral action to win the election. That means the nature of the policy established
by unilateral action here does not affect the president’s electoral fate at all. Thus, in this
case, the president can freely choose any policy that she prefers regardless of its mobilizing
effects. That is, L can choose a policy according L’s own judgment because L’s re-election
is secured regardless of L’s policy choice, which allows L to claim voters’ confidence in L.
In this sense, L appears to be what Weber called a “plebiscitary leader.” Let Q = GL −GR
denote the lower cut-point of Q such that L can act as a plebiscitary leader if Q is equal to
or less than Q.
31See Claim 1 in the Appendix.
32Since L’s unilateral action provides extra benefits to the targeted voters, tSL − tVL\SL > 0 always holds.
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Assume now that Q < Q. L acts unilaterally if supporters in SL can be sufficiently mo-
bilized to compensate for the loss of supporters in VL\SL. Given s and dL, let Q∗ denote the
maximum value of Q that satisfies the above condition (3.3).33 Then, Q∗ is the middle cut-
point such that L never acts unilaterally if Q > Q∗. Recall that L unilaterally acts because
doing so provides additional expressive utility dL with SL voters, and this dL motivates the
targeted supporters to turn out. However, if Q > Q∗, the mobilizing effect by the unilateral
action cannot compensate for the demobilizing effect because of either insufficient dL or s,
or both. Hence, if Q > Q∗, L is satisfied with the expected electoral victory only and waits
for the next period to establish the policy.
Finally, L acts unilaterally when Q < Q ≤ Q∗. The unilateral action here is not nec-
essary to win the upcoming election as in the first case (i.e., Q ≤ Q). However, unilateral
action is profitable now because of its sufficient mobilizing effects that guarantees that the
president wins. Taking unilateral action in this situation is observationally equivalent to
that of the first case, where the presence of sufficient mobilizing effects does not matter.
However, unilateral action in this situation is qualitatively different since its profitability
now depends on the presence of sufficient mobilizing effects. In other words, the reason the
policy can be established via unilateral action in this case is that the target group of the
policy is sufficiently large, and/or they sufficiently care about the policy given the magnitude
of voters’ constitutional qualms. That means, voters’ constitutional qualms do not constrain
the president’s unilateral action itself, but voters’ constitutional qualms at least limit the
policy options available to the president that can be established via unilateral action. In this
sense, the president in this case appears to be the “semi-plebiscitary leader.”
Let us now turn to the sub-case (ii) in which vL > vR. This case is the most friendly
political landscape. L has an advantage that the number of L supporters is larger than that
of R supporters, which increases all cut-points Q and Q∗ (compare (a) and (b) of Figure
33The intermediate value theorem implies that a unique Q∗ such that t′VL(Q
∗; ·) = m exists.
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Figure 3.1: L supporters’ turnout rates after unilateral action t′VL as a function of Q where tVL = 0.6,
tVR = 0.5, s = 0.3, dL = 3, and C ∼ N (2, 3). The president never takes unilateral action if Q > Q∗ since
t′VL becomes less than the minimum winning turnout rate m.
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3.1).34 It is because this advantage yields less m than that of the sub-case (i). Hence, L




This relaxation provides L with the opportunity in which L can more aggressively exercise
unilateral power.
In the sub-case (iii) in which vL < vR, the constraining power of voters’ constitutional
qualms is enhanced, which is described in Figure 3.1 as smaller Q∗ and Q than those of the
sub-case (i). The intuition behind this is that L can win the election only if L supporters’
turnout rate is sufficiently larger than R supporters’ turnout rate, so L has a slim buffer
zone that absorbs demobilizing effects as described in the area between the dashed and the
dotted horizontal lines in (c) of Figure 3.1.35
In summary, we see that presidential unilateral action is not a free pass to achieve the
policy goal. Rather, the president’s decision on the unilateral action is dependent on the
magnitude of constitutional qualms of voters. In addition, given a policy with s and dL, the
range of Q that allows the president to act unilaterally to establish the policy decreases as
the fraction of the president’s supporters decreases, as described in Figure 3.1. The following
Proposition 1 summarizes the results:
Proposition 1: Suppose tVLvL ≥ tVRvR. Consider a policy with fixed s and dL. Then,
there exists Q such that Q = GL − GR, and Q∗ such that t′VL(Q
∗; ·) = m. The president
acts unilaterally to establish the policy if Q ≤ Q∗, while the president’s unilateral action is




34See Claim 2 in the Appendix.
35See Claim 2 in the Appendix.
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3.3.2 Hostile Political Landscape
In the hostile political landscape, the president anticipates L’s electoral defeat (i.e., tVLvL <
tVRvR). There are three possible sub-cases: (i) vL = vR, (ii) vL > vR, and (iii) vL < vR. I
analyze sub-case (i) only because the results of sub-cases (ii) and (iii) naturally follow what
I have shown in the previous analysis of the friendly political landscape. In sub-case (i),
tVL < tVL = tVR , which implies that L loses the election if L does not take unilateral action.
Hence, it is impossible for the president to act unilaterally to only establish a policy in a
hostile political landscape.36 If the president unilaterally acts, it is only because the unilat-
eral action can change the electoral outcome by mobilizing the targeted supporters. Hence,
unlike in the friendly political landscape, the president cannot freely choose a policy to be
established by unilateral action. In particular, targeted supporters play a pivotal role in the
election if Q ≤ Q∗. To win the election, L must mobilize these pivotal supporters. That
said, the primary purpose of the presidential unilateral action is not to gain additional policy
benefits but to avoid electoral disaster. In this sense, the president’s decision on unilateral
action appears to be particularistic.37 Furthermore, if the president deeply cares about L’s
re-election, the president may take unilateral action even if the president’s constitutional
qualms outweigh the policy legacy concerns and/or even if the president does not prefer the
policy (i.e., |λ−QP | < |W |, where λ−Qp ≤ 0). The president’s unilateral action can thus
be interpreted as pandering.
Meanwhile, as in the friendly political landscape, voters’ constitutional qualms effectively
constrain the president’s unilateral action when Q > Q∗. However, the effectiveness of vot-
ers’ constitutional qualms as a constraint is enhanced in the hostile political landscape. The
reason is simple. In a hostile political landscape, GL < GR. Therefore, Q
∗ is lower than that
36See Claim 3 in the Appendix.
37The “particularistic presidency” refers to the president’s strategic behavior that aims to mobilize swing
voters who have a casting vote by providing an exclusive policy benefit to the specific constituencies (Kriner
and Reeves 2015, 2016). Reeves (2011) showed that presidential unilateral action is one of tools that the
president can use for this purpose.
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of the friendly political landscape.
There is another interesting case that can occur only in the hostile political landscape. If
the number of all L supporters is less than the number of R supporters who are expected to
turn out (i.e., tVRvR > vL), L never unilaterally acts since L cannot avoid electoral disaster
whatsoever. It is because the minimum winning turnout rate m must be at least 1, which is
impossible. The only way that L can improve the payoff in this case is to do nothing so that
L, at least, can keep the peace of constitutional mind. Note that Q is not even considered
in the president’s reasoning. This is an interesting case in which the presidential unilateral
action is perfectly constrained without any help from the voters’ constitutional concerns.38
The following Proposition 2 summarizes the results:
Proposition 2: Suppose tVLvL < tVRvR. Consider a policy with fixed s and dL. Then,
there exists Q∗ such that t′VL(Q
∗; ·) = m. The president acts unilaterally to establish the
policy if Q ≤ Q∗, while the president’s unilateral action is constrained by voters’ constitu-
tional qualms if Q > Q∗. Moreover, if tVRvR > vL, then the president never acts unilaterally
regardless of the value of Q. In addition, Q∗ moves toward 0 as vR
vL
increases.
Thus far, my model indicates that whether a given policy with fixed s and dL will be
established through the president’s unilateral action depends on the magnitude of voters’
constitutional qualms, which determines the electoral outcome through voter mobilization or
demobilization. This intuition is consistent with what Schattschneider (1960, 2) pointed out,
“The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in
the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants affects
38Some readers may wonder if the president takes unilateral action in this case since establishing the
policy he prefers is the only way for him to obtain positive payoffs given his electoral defeat is unavoidable.
However, the president cannot obtain positive policy benefits since the policy will be revoked by R in the
second period even if the president unilaterally acts in the first period.
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the result.” Furthermore, my model shows that the president’s observationally equivalent
engagements in unilateral action may come from different motivations. Recognizing these
different motivations is important because it raises a question over whether it is legitimate
to denounce the president’s use of unilateral action solely based on the violation of the
constitutional principle. I will examine this question below after extending my model by
incorporating independent voters.
3.4 Extension: Adding Independent Voters
I have excluded independent voters from my model so far. If we add independent voters
into the model, will this addition result in a more strict constraining power of voters’ con-
stitutional qualms? To answer this question, I now relax the assumption. Instead of the
assumption that all voters are partisan, I include independent voters who do not have a
partisan expressive utility of voting but have constitutional qualms. Except for this, these
independent voters share the same utility components as other partisan voters.39
These independent voters do not receive any partisan expressive benefits of voting. Thus,
they will turn out on election day if and only if the net cost of voting is non-positive, which
means they receive sufficient expressive utility from the act of voting other than partisan
expressive utility. Therefore, the expected independent voter turnout rate is F (0).
Call independent voters who turn out effective independent voters. If L acts unilaterally,
then it is obvious that all the effective independent voters cast a ballot for R because of
constitutional qualms. Otherwise, the effective independent voters are indifferent between L
and R. In the latter case, I assume that half of the effective independent voters vote for L,
while the other half vote for R.
With this new setting, these independent voters play the same role of R supporters
39I state only the main results. See the appendix for the mathematical reasoning behind the results.
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when L unilaterally acts. Then, effective independent voters increase m, which results in
all cut-points of constitutional qualms moving toward 0. In addition, the existence of the
independent voters makes it much easier to remove any winning possibility for the president
regardless of the magnitude of voters’ constitutional qualms, which is the case pointed out
in the analysis of the hostile political landscape. It is because the condition for this case to
happen now changes from tVRvR > vL to tVRvR + v
∗
I > vL. That is, even if the number of
R supporters who turn out is less than or equal to that of L supporters (i.e., tVRvR ≤ vL),
since all the effective independent voters will vote for R if the president acts unilaterally,
it is still possible that the president’s unilateral action can be constrained regardless of the
magnitude of voters’ constitutional qualms if sufficient effective voters exist. Furthermore,
this case now can occur even in the friendly political landscape when v∗I ≥ vL. Consequently,
the president is more constrained in both political landscapes because there is too much to
lose by unilateral action.
The lesson is that with more existing the effective independent voters, the use of unilat-
eral actions is more strictly constrained. The effective independent voters directly suppress
the president’s unilateral action, primarily by adding more votes for R. That is, the exis-
tence of the effective voters increases the minimally required L supporters’ turn out rate for
the president to win the election. In other words, the effective independent voters’ negative
reactions against unilateral action becomes the additional cost of the president’s unilateral
action besides the cost from L voters’ constitutional qualms. Consequently, we may ex-
pect that voters’ constitutional qualms become more effective in constraining the president’s
unilateral action.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
I began with a simple puzzle of why the president does not always invoke unilateral power to
establish a policy that is not likely to pass in a normal legislative process although checks and
balances from other branches are ineffective. To solve this puzzle, I propose to consider that
the president uses unilateral action to mobilize supporters to secure re-election. Establishing
a policy through unilateral action provides extra partisan benefits of voting to a subgroup
of the president’s supporters, which in turn increases their turnout rate. At the same time,
however, unilateral action is not costless because it activates voters’ constitutional qualms
that lead them to abstain. Hence, the president acts unilaterally only if the mobilizing effects
sufficiently outweigh the demobilizing effects so that the president’s unilateral action can be
legitimized in terms of the president’s electoral victory. This conclusion not only explains
the variation in the president’s decisions on the use of unilateral action but also poses a
fundamental question regarding whether it is fair to criticize unilateral action based on the
lack of constitutionality only.
The president’s unilateral action acquires popular support expressed in the election, and
this popular support may provide democratic legitimacy that can compensate for the lack
of constitutional legitimacy. In particular, if we can interpret the magnitude of voters’ con-
stitutional qualms as the degree of popular support for the Constitution, it is possible to
conclude that the president’s exercise of unilateral action occurs when voters deeply care
more about the policy than about the constitutional principle. Moreover, it is also possible
that the president is allowed to use constitutionally controversial unilateral action to estab-
lish a policy that champions constitutional rights of a certain subgroup of voters. Hence,
the model implies that it may be unfair to denounce the president’s unilateral action to be
illegitimate based on the lack of constitutionality only.
For example, plebiscitary leadership, where the president unilaterally establishes a pol-
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icy according to the president’s own judgment, is possible because the president can claim
voters’ confidence through the election even though the president violates the constitutional
principle. Together with the lack of constitutionality, this plebiscitary leadership may look
problematic because the president can further his or her own interests rather than voters’
interests via unilateral action. However, if the president is committed to protecting and
furthering voters’ interests, then it is this guaranteed electoral success that enables the pres-
ident to establish a proper policy even when the chosen policy is unpopular among voters
and legislators (for such “true leadership” of the president, see Canes-Wrone and Shotts
2004). Although my model does not speak to whether the president is a good or bad type,
the model at least suggests that discussion on how to elect the president who can exercise
true leadership via unilateral action in the first place might be more constructive than a
blind denunciation of presidential unilateral action.
If we are still concerned about the possibility of a bad type president’s arbitrary policy
choice, the semi-plebiscitary leadership would be an ideal instance where voters’ constitu-
tional qualms constrain the president’s policy choice. Although the president’s unilateral
action is unconstrained, the non-negligible demobilizing effects of unilateral action from vot-
ers’ constitutional qualms at least force the president to choose a policy whose target group
is sufficiently large to guarantee the president’s re-election. Moreover, unlike in the situation
with particularism, there is no incentive for the president to pander to voters because the
president’s re-election is guaranteed without conducting unilateral action. Hence, the presi-
dent would initiate unilateral action only if a particular policy is deemed to be appropriate
by both the president and a substantial fraction of voters. Again, I admit that my model is
incapable of distinguishing whether the target group’s claim is compatible with democratic
values. However, my model suggests that unilateral action is a double-edged sword: Unilat-
eral action can yield either benign or malign effects on our democracy, which is dependent
on the nature of the target group’s claim.
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This double-edged unilateral action is especially eminent in the situation with partic-
ularism, which also seems problematic for our democracy. The unilateral action from the
particularism not only lacks constitutionality but also may lead the president to pander to
pivotal voters to win the election. However, this particularism at the same time provides
an opportunity for minority groups seeking rights-based claims to have the president to es-
tablish a policy that advocates their claims through unilateral action, although the minority
groups must be pivotal in deciding the electoral outcome. President Truman’s desegregation
of the armed forces is one example. President Truman faced a hostile political landscape
considering that Truman’s defeat was almost unanimously predicted by polls prior to the
1948 presidential election. However, the electoral outcome was Truman’s surprising victory,
as indicated by the famous incorrect headline on the Chicago Daily Tribune on election day:
“Dewey Defeats Truman.” One of the reasons for Truman’s win was Executive Order 9981
that directs desegregation of the armed forces. To win the election, President Truman was
encouraged to target African American voters by enacting more aggressive policies on de-
segregation because these African American voters were expected to play a pivotal role in
his electoral success in the election as the following memorandum shows:
[T]he northern Negro voter today holds the balance of power in Presidential elec-
tions for the simple arithmetic reason that the Negroes not only vote in a bloc but
are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral
states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan (Donaldson
1999, 26, cited by Nzelibe 2011, 424).
Moreover, many studies present ample of evidence that Truman carefully timed initiating
the executive order to garner support from African American voters who were pro-Democrat,
politically inactive, but whose size was large enough to be pivotal (e.g., Morgan 1970; Taylor
65
2013).
As such, the president’s unilateral action is constitutionally illegitimate but simultane-
ously legitimate in terms of popular support expressed in the election because the president
acts unilaterally only when there exists popular support coming from voters’ weak consti-
tutional qualms. What I emphasize here is that this dual legitimacy of unilateral action
suggests that we need to pay more attention to possibly benign but neglected effects of uni-
lateral action on our democracy. In particular, if the Constitution is the principal culprit of
the dysfunctional government as Howell and Moe (2016) claimed, then it would be critical
to examine the legitimacy of unilateral action from popular support in making a normative
judgment on unilateral action.
Although I do not directly investigate how the degree of voters’ constitutional qualms is
determined, the model suggests that congressional political tactics to constrain the president
may be one of the sources. In their provocative study, Posner and Vermeule (2010) claimed
that the danger of executive tyranny is not worrisome even though the executive is legally
unbound because the executive is politically bound. They argued that “these checks are not
primarily legal. [...] Rather legislators appeal to the court of public opinion, which in turn
constrains the president” (Posner and Vermeule 2010, 61). This suggests a possibility that
legislators can constrain unilateral action through affecting public opinion even in the ab-
sence of effective institutional ways of checks and balances. That is, legislators may cultivate
stronger constitutional qualms of voters that are enough to constrain the exercise of unilat-
eral action by the president. For example, Kriner and Schickler (2016) and Christenson and
Kriner (2017b) showed that Congress challenges unilateral action using various tools (e.g.,
congressional investigation) to enhance voters’ constitutional qualms.
In the model, voters’ constitutional qualms play a crucial role in constraining unilateral
action. That is, it is more likely for the president to act unilaterally as voters’ constitutional
qualms become weaker. Then, the expansion of presidential power throughout U.S. history
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may reflect the weakening trend of voters’ constitutional qualms. This provides food for
thought about the sources of the rise of the unilateral presidency. Conventionally, the am-
biguity of the Constitution and the rise of the administrative state have been understood as
the primary sources of the rise of the unilateral presidency (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b).
However, these factors just added unilateral action to the president’s arsenal of many poli-
cymaking tools. What makes unilateral action a profitable policymkaing tool and, in turn,
leads the president to actually use it is voters’ weak constitutional qualms. Hence, it may be
voters who finally approved and invited the unilateral presidency. Elections, through which
voters’ constitutional qualms constrain the unilateral presidency, have played a role of the
extra-constitutional mechanism that determines whether the president’s unilateral action is
legitimate in dealing with newly emerged political needs.40
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Claim 1
Unilateral action ensures the president’s electoral victory if and only if
t′VL ≥ m. (3.4)





The sufficient condition for that the right hand side of (5) is well-defined is tSL − tVL\SL 6= 0,
which is satisfied since we assume that dL > 0, which implies tSL − tVL\SL > 0.
40Regarding the extra-constitutional mechanism, see Skowrenek (2009).
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The sufficient condition for that (5) always holds for all s ∈ (0, 1) is
m− tVL\SL ≤ 0
m ≤ tVL\SL .
The remaining case is then m > tVL\SL . Note that both tSL−tVL\SL > 0 and tVL−tVL\SL >
0 imply that the right hand side of (5) is always positive. Thus, if tSL < m, then (5) is greater
than or equal to 1, which implies that (5) never holds for all s ∈ (0, 1). 2
Proof of Claim 2
Suppose that L wins the election and vL > vR. From the fact that F is continuous and


















> GL−GR, which implies that Q here is greater
than its counterpart in the sub-case (i). Similarly, the right hand side of the inequality (3) is
replaced by vR
vL
tVR , which is less than F (GR) . Note that the left hand side of the inequality
(3) is a monotonically decreasing function in Q, having other parameters fixed. Hence, Q∗
increases.
Now, suppose L wins but vL < vR instead. Since we assume that L wins the election,






> F−1(tVR) = GR. It must be the case that tVR <
vL
vR
since we assume that L wins the election without the president’s unilateral action. Then,
the symmetric argument in the case where vL > vR shows that Q
∗ and Q go down than
those of the sub-case (i). Moreover, vL < vR implies that
vR
vL
> 1, m > tVR . This result
substantively implies that GL must be greater than GR because L cannot enjoy the joy of
the electoral victory if L voters turn out less than or equal to R voters under no unilateral
action. In plain words, there is no situation in which L wins if L voters are outnumbered
by R voters and R voters are more loyal than L voters (i.e., GL ≤ GR), which is possible in
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sub-case (ii). 2
Proof of Claim 3
Recall that the plebiscitary leadership is possible only when Q ≤ GL − F−1(m). Since
GL < F
−1(m) in the hostile political landscape, GL − F−1(m) is always negative. However,
Q must be positive, which implies that this condition never holds. 2
Adding Independent Voters
Let VI denote the set of independent voters. Let tVI denote the expected turnout rate of
the independent voters such that tVI = F (0). Let V
∗
I denote the set of effective independent
voters who will turn out such that v∗I = tVIvI . Since the independent voters do not receive
any extra expressive benefits of voting from L’s unilateral action but L’s unilateral action
only activates the independent voters’ constitutional qualms, all effective independent voters
will vote for R if L initiates unilateral action.












which is greater than that of the setting without independent voters since the unilateral ac-
tion leads all the effective independent voters to vote for R. If vL ≤ v∗I , then m is at least
1 regardless of the relative size between vL and vR. If vL > v
∗
I , as long as the difference
between the numbers of L and R voters is less than the number of effective independent





), m is at least
1 regardless of the relative size between vL and vR.
Now, assume that the political landscape is not too hostile as specified in the previous
paragraph. Still, the president is more constrained because the constraining power of L
voters’ constitutional qualms is also enhanced, which is reflected by the fact that all the cut
points in every sub-case are less than their counterparts in the setting without independent
voters. This is because m is greater here than that of the setting without independent voters.
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In a similar vein, presidential unilateral actions are more strictly constrained in the friendly
political landscape (i.e., tVLvL +
1
2
v∗I ≥ tVRvR + 12v
∗
I ). If v
∗
I ≥ vL, m is at least 1 regardless of






. If vL ≤ v∗I , then
m ≥ 1. Recall that the president’s unilateral actions are profitable if and only if t′VL ≥ m.
However, since t′VL < 1 and m ≥ 1, this condition never holds regardless of Q. Assume that
vL > v
∗
I instead. Still, 1) if tVR ≥
v∗I
vL
when vL = vR, or 2) if tVR ≥
vL−v∗I
vR
when vL > vR,
then m is at least 1 regardless of the relative size between vL and vR. Note that we already
assumed that tVR <
vL
vR




Let us turn to the cases where all the parameters are appropriately set to avoid the case
in which m is at least 1 regardless of the relative size between vL and vR. As in the hostile
political landscape, all the cut points of Q decrease regardless of the relative size of L and
R voters, which results in the enhanced constraining power of voters’ constitutional qualms
in every sub-case compared to the setting without independent voters. This is because the
minimum winning L voter turnout rate m increases compared to its counter part in the
setting without independent voters. 2
When There Exists the Counter-Mobilization of R Supporters
L’s unilateral action can mainly cause the counter-mobilization of R supporters in two ways.
First, some R supporters who dislike the policy L established by unilateral action may be
encouraged to turn out and vote for R as a punishment to L. Second, R supporters may
be inspired to turn out to punish L for his/her violation of the constitutional principles.
These two cases are not mutually exclusive. However, regardless the way through which
R supporters are inspired to turn out, the result is that more R supporters will turn out.
This implies that the minimum winning turnout rate of L’s supporters (i.e., m) now will be
higher.
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Consider the friendly political landscape. Assume that vL = vR. Let m
◦ denote the
minimum winning turnout rate of L supporters when L’s unilateral action activates the
counter-mobilization of R supporters. Then, there exists G◦R such that m
◦ = F (G◦R) since
F (G◦R) = m
◦ > F (GR) = m. Then, we have G
◦
R > GR. Since Q = GL − GR, the new
threshold Q◦ = GL − G◦R must be less than Q. That is, voters’ weak constitutional qualms
that would have cause the plebiscitary leadership of the president in the absence of the
counter-mobilization of R supporters now may prohibit the president from exercising such
leadership. In addition, if the effects of the counter-mobilization of R supporters are strong
enough to satisfy G◦R ≥ GL, then the plebiscitary leadership never happens regardless of the
value of Q.
If the unilateral action is not costly (i.e., Q = 0), then the turnout rate of L support-
ers after unilateral action is sF (GL + dL) + (1 − s)F (GL), and this is the maximum turn
out rate of L supporters that the president can produce by unilateral action. Hence, if
sF (GL + dL) + (1− s)F (GL) < F (G◦R) (i.e., s <
F (G◦R)−F (GL)
F (GL+dL)−F (GL)
), then L never acts unilat-







Therefore, L never acts unilaterally regardless of the value of Q when G◦R ≥ GL + dL. If






< 0. Hence, there
exists an unique Q∗◦ such that t′VL(Q
∗◦; ·) = m◦ and Q◦ < Q∗◦. Note that t′VL is decreasing
in Q, which implies that Q∗◦ < Q∗ because m < m◦. This result also shows that the con-
straining power of voter’s constitutional qualms is enhanced thanks to the existence of the
counter-mobilization of R supporters. The remaining case is GL ≤ G◦R < GL + dL in which
there does not exist Q◦. In this case, it is possible that there does not exist Q∗◦ such that
Q∗◦ > 0 as well. For Q∗◦ to exist, either s or dL or both must be sufficiently large enough




. That means, the counter-mobilization of R supporters forces
the president to choose a policy whose target group is sufficiently large and/or deeply cares
about the policy in the first place. After choosing such a policy, the president now needs to
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consider whether L supporters’ constitutional qualms are less than or equal to Q∗◦.
Now, assume that vL > vR. Then, m
◦ = vR
vL
F (G◦R) < F (G
◦
R). If GL ≤ F−1(m◦),
then the plebiscitary leadership never happens. If GL > F
−1(m◦), there exists Q◦ and
Q∗◦. It is easy to see that Q◦ here is larger than that of the case where vL = vR because
GL − F−1(m◦) > GL −G◦R. In addition, Q∗◦ here is also larger than that of the case where
vL = vR because t
′
VL
is decreasing in Q. If GL ≤ F−1(m◦) < GL + dL, then Q∗◦ exists if and





. Note that this this condition is also relaxed compared to the
case where vL = vR. Again, Q
∗◦ here is larger compared to the case where vL = vR because
t′VL is decreasing in Q.
Assume that vL < vR. Then, m
◦ = vR
vL
F (G◦R) > F (G
◦
R). If m
◦ ≥ 1, then the president
never acts unilaterally. Hence, we restrict our attention to the cases in which m◦ < 1. Then,
by the opposite of the argument in the previous paragraph, Q◦ and Q∗◦ moves toward 0 when
vL < vR. In addition, both the condition for the existence of the plebiscitary leadership and
the condition for the existence of Q∗◦ when GL ≤ F−1(m◦) < GL + dL are strengthened
compared to the case where vL = vR.
In sum, the counter-mobilization of R supporters (i.e., G◦R) imposes an additional con-
strain on L’s unilateral action besides L supporters’ constitutional qualms. Recall that this
effects of the counter-mobilization of R supporters originates from that the minimally re-
quired turnout rate of L supporters for L to win the election increases.
Consider the hostile political landscape. Assume that vL ≥ vR. Then, we have F (GL) <
F (G◦R) ≤ m◦, which implies that GL < G◦R ≤ F−1(m◦) always holds. Hence, the plebiscitary
leadership never occurs. So, there are only two possible cases: GL < G
◦
R ≤ F−1(m◦) <
GL + dL and GL + dL < G
◦
R ≤ F−1(m◦). Again, the president never acts unilaterally when
GL + dL < G
◦
R ≤ F−1(m◦). If GL < G◦R ≤ F−1(m◦) < GL + dL, then there exists Q∗◦ such
that t′VL(Q




. Note that G◦R here
is greater than that of the friendly political landscape given the same GL, which implies
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that m◦ here is greater than that of the friendly political landscape. Hence, we see that the
condition for the existence of Q∗◦ is much strengthened compared to the friendly political
landscape and Q∗◦ is less that that of the political landscape.
Assume now that vL < vR. Again, if m
◦(= vR
vL
F (G◦R)) ≥ 1, then the president never




F (GR), which implies that GL < GR < G
◦
R < F
−1(m◦). Hence, again, the
plebiscitary leadership never happens. The remaining cases are the same as the cases in
which vL ≥ vR except that the condition for the existence of Q∗◦ is more strengthened and
Q∗◦ is much closer to 0 compared to the cases in which vL ≥ vR.
Overall, we see that the existence of the counter-mobilization of R supporters does not
substantially change the results of the hostile political landscape from the results of the main
text. Also, the intuitions behind the results in the hostile political landscape in the main
text are the same here.
Considering that the different results between in the political landscape and the hostile
landscape in the main text are mainly produced by the increased minimum winning turnout
rate of L supporters in the hostile political landscape, the role of the counter-mobilization
of R supporters is to lead the president to play as he/she in the hostile political landscape
although the president faces the friendly political landscape under certain circumstances. If
we newly define the friendly and the hostile political landscape according to whether the
president can exercise the plebiscitary leadership, then the intuition here is exactly the same
as described in the main text but we lose the simplicity of our model. For this reason, we
do not include the counter-mobilization of R supporters. 2
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Chapter 4. The Welfare Implications
of Separation of Powers and
Competitive Elections in Policy
Implementation
4.1 Introduction
Separation of powers splits the legislative, executive, and judicial powers into three branches
of government so that each branch’s ambition can be used to check and balance the ambition
of the other branches to protect personal liberties from unfettered government power. As
James Madison famously put, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract to ambition.” This
idea of checks and balances through separation of powers has been firmly established as the
core principle of American government and is celebrated by many Americans without doubt.
Yet, it is questionable whether separation of powers is indeed indispensable for preventing
tyranny in a democracy because democracy has another mechanism through which people
can control the holders of powers, thereby preventing usurpation of powers: competitive
elections. For example, Peter Singer claims that separation of powers is not a necessary con-
dition for preventing the rise of tyranny by counterexamples of Britain and former British
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colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, which have never fallen into tyranny,
although these countries do not have constitutional separation of powers.41
While separation of powers seems redundant in preventing usurpation of powers, there
are growing concerns that separation of powers reduces the government’s effective problem-
solving ability (Kelly 1993; Edwards et al. 1997; Krehbiel 1998; Binder 1999, 2015; Coleman
1999; Brady and Craig 2005; Mansbridge 2012; Howell and Moe 2016). This is because
separation of powers requires consent from both the legislature and executive to enact and
implement a policy, which increases the likelihood of a political stalemate. In other words,
separation of powers creates multiple veto points. According to Justice Antonin Scalia,
“[political stalemate] is exactly the way [the framers] set it up. [The framers] wanted power
contradicting power to prevent an excess of legislation.”42
This poses a theoretical puzzle. Despite the fact that elected officials can be disciplined
by competitive elections and separation of powers leads to the ineffectiveness of government
in solving national problems, why do we still maintain separation of powers as the core
principle of organizing government? Is this because Americans have intrinsic preferences
for separation of powers as some scholars argue (Erikson 1988; Jacobson 1990; Ladd 1990;
Fiorina 1991, 1992)? Or, are there any other welfare grounds that can justify separation of
powers? In other words, can separation of powers improve voters’ welfare in a way that is
not redundant with competitive elections?
To address these questions, this paper presents a formal model that focuses on how
separation of powers and electoral competition jointly affect voters’ welfare in the policy
implementation stage. The model is a single-period game in which the executive and legis-
41Singer, Peter. 2013. “The Founding Fathers’ Fiscal Crisis.” Project Syndicate, October
2. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/peter-singerthe-constitutional-roots-of-america-s-fiscal-
crisis (December 12, 2019).
42Savage, David G. 2011. “Justice Scalia: Americans ‘Should Learn to Love Gridlock.’ ” Los Angeles
Times, October 5. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005 (February
14, 2019).
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lature play a take-it-or-leave-it game over the amount of funds for policy implementation,
and a representative voter chooses to either retain the incumbent president or replace the
incumbent with a challenger after having observed the outcome of the implemented policy.
There are two states of the world and all players are imperfectly informed about the true
state of the world. There are two policy options, one of which is best carried out by the
incumbent president (the president’s policy in shorthand), while the other is best carried out
by the challenger (the challenger’s policy in shorthand). The likelihood of policy success is
affected by the amount of funds. The necessary condition for policy success is the match
between an implemented policy and the true state of the world.
A central finding is that separation of powers can prevent the incumbent’s underfunding
decision coming from electoral concerns during the policy implementation stage, thereby
improving voters’ welfare, but only under certain conditions under which the challenger is
willing to provide sufficient funds to win the election. In other words, separation of powers
can mitigate the malign effects of electoral competition, thereby helping electoral competi-
tion properly work to improve voters’ welfare. Recognizing this mechanism through which
separation of powers improves voters’ welfare is a key contribution of the model to the liter-
ature. In addition, the model also revisits the welfare implications of a political stalemate.
A political stalemate does not necessarily imply a dysfunctional government, and thereby
welfare loss. The model shows that recognizing the motives behind a political stalemate is
indispensable for knowing whether a political stalemate is reduces or improves voters’ wel-
fare.
The key innovation of the model is to consider separation of powers in the strategic sit-
uations regarding funding decisions during the policy implementation stage. Replacing the
status quo requires not only enacting a new policy in the legislative stage but also the ef-
fective implementation of it. In the policy implementation stage, separation of powers gives
the power of the purse (i.e., the power to determine the amount of funds for implementing a
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policy) to the legislature. Moreover, as in the legislative stage, the implementation of policy
requires the consent from both bodies about the amount of funds. Hence, separation of
powers creates a strategic situation in which the two bodies affect voters’ welfare, which is
measured in terms of the ex-ante expected utilities from the policy.
Electoral competition further complicates the two bodies’ strategic considerations. Elec-
tions are a key mechanism through which voters can choose politicians who act in the best
interests of voters. However, it is challenging for voters to make a correct decision because
they are imperfectly informed about who the best candidate is. Under such imperfect in-
formation, voters use any information sources available to them to make more informed
decisions, and policy outcomes are a good information source for this purpose. Based on
this, it is natural to expect that reelection-minded policymakers consider not only the like-
lihood of policy success but also how the expected policy outcome affects their electoral
prospects when they make policy decisions (see Dewan and Hortala-Vallve forthcoming).
How does separation of powers interact with electoral competitions? A simple and intu-
itive way to discover any welfare effects of separation of powers is to compare each level of
voter welfare in the presence and absence of separation of powers. Let me present one exam-
ple. Suppose that a voter believes that the president’s policy is more likely to solve a national
problem than the challenger’s policy. Call the president is popular in such situations. The
incumbent president will be reelected as long as the voter still deems the president’s policy
to be a correct solution after observing the policy outcome. Given this, the incumbent pres-
ident faces a dilemma associated with the amount of funds. On one hand, the incumbent
president may want to implement the president’s policy with full funds to maximize the
likelihood of policy success because it proves that the president’s policy is indeed the correct
one, which leads the voter to re-elect the incumbent president. In addition, the president
can enjoy some utilities from the policy side.
On the other hand, as the amount of funds increases, the voter becomes more skeptical
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about the president’s policy if the policy outcome turns out to be a failure because blaming
the lack of funds for failure is not convincing to the voter given the large amount of funds.
In fact, if the amount of funds is sufficiently large and the policy fails, then the voter now
believes that the challenger’s policy is more likely to solve the problem, thereby replacing
the incumbent president with the challenger. In other words, the voter will be persuaded by
policy failure to change her choice from the incumbent president to the challenger.
Facing this dilemma, there are three motives for the incumbent president. First, the
incumbent president may prefer full funds that maximize the likelihood of policy success
because policy success guarantees both reelection and positive utilities from policy success,
which I call gambling on success. Second, the incumbent president may prefer somewhat
intermediate levels of funds to avoid possible persuasion after policy failure at the expense
of maximization of the likelihood of policy success, which I call playing safe.43 Finally, it
is also possible that the incumbent president prefers not to implement any policy (through
the formal veto power, delaying, or policy sabotage) if the incumbent president deeply fears
the failure of the policy because a political stalemate does not provide any policy outcome
that can be used by the voter to update her belief, thereby guaranteeing the incumbent
president’s reelection. Moreover, the incumbent president can avoid any negative utilities
from policy failure as well. Although this can be considered an extreme case of playing safe,
I call this fear of failure to emphasize that the incumbent president’s fear of failure causes
a political stalemate, while playing safe results in the implementation of the policy. Notice
that a political stalemate can arise from another motive that the incumbent president does
not have. For example, it is possible that the legislature does not provide any funds at all
to block the implementation of a wrong policy, which resonates with Madison’s original idea
of checks and balances. This motive is clearly not associated with electoral concerns. To
43I borrowed these terms (i.e., gambling on success (or failure) and playing safe) from Dewan and Hortala-
Vallve (forthcoming).
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emphasize this non-electoral origin of a political stalemate, I call this motive checks and
balances.
If there is no separation of powers (e.g., a unified government), then the incumbent
president can determine the amount of funds. Hence, the incumbent president’s task is a
simple optimization of the amount of funds. Below, I show that the optimal action for the
incumbent president is to play safe if the probability that the president’s policy matches the
true state of the world is sufficiently large, and otherwise fear of failure leads the incumbent
president to cause a political stalemate.
If there is separation of powers, however, the amount of funds is determined by the legis-
lature. Consider the legislature controlled by the challenger’s party, where the challenger can
virtually decide the legislature’s actions (i.e., a divided government). Note that the only way
for the challenger to win the election is to persuade the voter to cast a vote for the challenger
given the voter’s initial belief that the president’s policy is correct. This persuasion happens
only after the implementation of the president’s policy with a sufficiently large amount of
funds turns out to be a failure.
If the challenger sufficiently cares more about office benefits than the utilities from the
policy side, it is obvious that the challenger wants to decrease the likelihood of policy success
as much as possible because the challenger needs policy failure to persuade the voter. Yet,
at the same time, the challenger also must to provide sufficiently large funds so that the
voter will not think that the failure of the president’s policy comes from the lack of funds.
This is not the end of the challenger’s calculations. Separation of powers vests the power to
carry out a policy in the executive, which implies that the challenger’s grand plan to win
the election is impossible unless the incumbent president actually chooses to carry out the
president’s policy. Therefore, the challenger must set the amount of funds to be large enough
to entice the incumbent president into implementing the president’s policy. Given this, it is
optimal for the challenger to provide the minimal amount of funds that is sufficiently large to
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persuade the voter after policy failure and to lead the president to implement the president’s
policy, which I call gambling on failure.
In this example, imposing separation of powers changes the holder of the purse, thereby
changing the motive behind a funding decision, from playing safe to gambling on failure.
Since gambling on failure leads to larger funds than playing safe, we see that separation of
powers improves the voter’s welfare. Overall, as shown in the example, separation of powers
can improve the voter’s welfare by giving the power of the purse to one whose motive behind
a funding decision results in the implementation of a correct policy with larger funds.
In general, the voter’s welfare increases as the motive behind a funding decision of the
holder of the purse changes from playing safe to gambling on failure to gambling on success.
Unfortunately, however, separation of powers does not always lead to a change of the motive
in the direction that improves voters’ welfare. To see why, consider another example in which
the voter initially believes that the challenger’s policy is the correct one. I say the challenger
is popular in such situations. In this case, it is possible that the challenger wants to play
safe, while the incumbent president is willing to gamble on failure. If this is the case, then
it is obvious that the absence of separation of powers (i.e., giving the power of the purse to
the incumbent president) improves the voter’s welfare. Given these nuanced welfare effects
of separation of powers, it is important to specify the conditions under which separation
of powers leads to a change of the motive behind a funding decision in the direction that
improves the voter’s welfare, which will be presented in the remainder of this paper.
The above conclusion is valid only when a correct policy is implemented. Yet, it is pos-
sible that a wrong policy is implemented. Regarding this possibility, the model provides
interesting welfare implications of a political stalemate. As introduced in the beginning of
this paper, it is usually perceived that a political stalemate implies a dysfunctional govern-
ment, and thereby welfare loss. However, the model clearly shows that a political stalemate
does not necessarily imply welfare loss. The negative relationship between a political stale-
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mate and the effectiveness of the government requires a strong assumption that a new policy
always produces a better outcome than the status quo.44 Yet, it is possible that a newly
enacted policy produces a worse outcome than the status quo after its implementation.45 In
this case, a political stalemate actually improves the voter’s welfare by blocking the imple-
mentation of a wrong policy, which is often neglected but is the basic idea of Madisonian
checks and balances (see Ethridge 2010; Kang 2017). Given this nuanced role of a political
stalemate, the model presents a useful frame to differentiate a welfare-improving political
stalemate from a welfare-losing political stalemate: the motive behind the observed political
stalemate. The model demonstrates that a welfare-reducing political stalemate comes out
of the fear of failure, while the motive of checks and balances leads to a welfare-improving
political stalemate.
This paper is related to several streams of literature. The first stream of literature is
about democratic accountability when multiple bodies’ consent is necessary to implement
policy. Buisseret (2016) demonstrated the cases in which voters’ welfare is likely to be re-
duced by a veto player’s desire to build reputation through obstructing the implementation
of policy in the presidential system. In extending Buisseret’s insight, Hirsch and Kastellec
(2019) presented a theory of policy sabotage, in which a saboteur may block the implemen-
tation to signal the incumbent president’s type to the voter. While this paper also focuses
44In fact, this strong assumption resonates with the Hobbesian view of the state of nature. To Hobbes,
the state of nature is bellum omnium contra omnes (i.e. the war of all against all), which is the worst state.
Therefore, having a strong and centralized government is always better even if the government can abuse
power because any policy enacted and implemented by such a government will produce a better outcome
than the state of war. According to the “two presidencies thesis” (Dahl 1950; Wildavsky 1966), this strong
assumption is widely accepted regarding foreign policies, in particular, during wartime. This is because the
president is assumed to have more information, and therefore, the president’s policy is more likely to be
correct (Canes-Wrone et al. 2008; Howell et al. 2013). But there is no such a wide agreement about the
assumption regarding domestic policies.
45This view resonates with the Lockean view of the state of nature. To Locke, the state of nature is not
necessarily the worst state because natural law exists even in the state of nature, which allows people to
avoid a chaotic state. Therefore, government can be justified only if the outcome of having government is
better than the state of nature, which allows the possibility that government may produce a worse outcome
than the state of nature.
81
on the motive of blocking policy implementation with this paper, this paper emphasizes the
incumbent’s potential incentive for not implementing a policy for electoral purposes (e.g.,
unobservable policy sabotage), thereby examining the challenger’s possible incentive to mit-
igate such a problem.
The second stream of literature is about the effects of separation of powers. One main
theme of the literature is the effects of separation of powers on the extremity of policy. For
example, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 1996, 2000) demonstrated that separation of powers
leads to the moderation of policy. This paper departs by focusing on the effectiveness of
policy implementation in terms of the amount of funds. Another main theme of the litera-
ture is whether separation of powers can mitigate or aggravate the principal-agent problem
caused by asymmetric information. Persson et al. (1997) proposed the seminal model of
separation of powers, which showed that separation of powers eliminates asymmetric infor-
mation between elected politicians and voters, thereby preventing politicians’ informational
rent-seeking. Ting (2001) showed that asymmetric information and separation of powers
creates the legislature’s dilemma: whether to choose a good but wasteful policy or a bad but
efficient policy. Gailmard (2017) presented the strategic foundation of separation of powers
in America: solving the principal-agent problem between an imperial crown and colonial
governors by giving power to colonial settlers whose interests are aligned with the imperial
crown. The key departure of this paper from the literature is that there is no asymmetric
information. This paper focuses on strategic motives behind funding decisions that affect
common information shared by all players.
Such departure naturally connects this paper to the literature on policy reform or pol-
icy experimentation. Callander (2011a, 2011b) demonstrated the process of searching for a
good policy under the common policy preferences setting, which is also used in this paper
(see also Callander and Hummel 2014). There are models that analyze the effects of elec-
toral pressures on policy reform. Majumdar and Mukand (2004) showed that a politician’s
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electoral concerns lead the politicain to refrain from engaging in policy experimentation at
the expense of information that the politician can learn through policy failure. Dewan and
Hortala-Vallve (forthcoming) added the effects of the opposition’s campaign to Majumdar
and Mukand’s model and showed that the opposition’s campaign exacerbates the voters’
welfare, which is also featured in Prato and Wolton (2016). In another work by Prato and
Wolton (2018), implementing policy reform depends on the likelihood of the success of it
and the degree of the demand for change. Although these studies nicely show how the in-
cumbent’s electoral concerns discourage the incumbent’s engagement in policy reform, they
do not consider the essential characteristics of separation of powers in which the opposition
also actively engages in the policy implementation under separation of powers. This is the
key departure of the model from the literature.
In this paper, the amount of funds is the key factor that affects voters’ welfare. This
aspect relates the paper to Millner et al. (2014), where the incumbent has an incentive to
over-invest in a policy experiment to learn much information that will be passed to the future
government. This paper extends the insight by Millner et al. by incorporating politicians’
office motivation into the model. The persuasion effects after policy failure in the model
relate this work to Hirsch (2016), where the principal defers to the agent’s choice of the
course of the policy experiment in expecting that the failure of the policy experiment will
persuade the agent to agree and implement the course of the policy experiment chosen by the
principal with a high effort level. While Hirsch’s model focuses on an intra-organizational
setting, this paper examines the persuasion effects in an inter-organizational setting where
the two organizations compete in elections.
Finally, this paper contributes to the implementation research pioneered by Pressman and
Wildavsky (1984), given that there are only a few studies that focus on variation in policy
outcomes that come from different implementation outcomes (see Winter 2012). Specifically,
following Bardach’s (1977) view of policy implementation as a continuation of the political
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game from the policy formation stage, in which various actors seek their interests in the im-
plementation stage, this paper examines how separation of powers and competitive elections
affect the actors’ behaviors in policy implementation and thereby the outcome of the policy
implementation.
4.2 The Model
There are three players: the incumbent president (P ), a challenger (C), and a representative
voter (V ). Whether there is a separation of power or not, P chooses a policy to implement.46
After that, the legislature determines the amount of funds. Under separation of powers,
C decides the amount of funds to be provided for implementing the policy chosen by P .
This assumes that the legislature is controlled by C’s party (i.e., a divided government),
which is not a harmful assumption considering that a unified government where both the
executive and legislature are controlled by P ’s party is qualitatively equivalent to the setting
where there is no separation of powers. If there is no separation of powers (i.e., a unified
government), P determines the amount of funds. If no funds are provided at this stage,
then there will be no implementation of the policy and the election follows. If a positive
amount of funds was provided, then P must decide whether to implement the policy with
the provided funds or to veto the implementation of the policy.47 If P vetoes, then there is
no policy implementation and the election follows. If P accepts, then the outcome of the
46Although this assumption is inconsistent with the legislative power that is vested in the legislature, it
does not cause a substantive change of the results because P has a final say in whether to implement a
policy in the policy implementation stage. That is, if we modify the model to allow C to choose a policy
instead of P , and if C’s choice is different from the equilibrium policy choice in the original model, then a
political stalemate always arises, which makes the model less interesting. Moreover, this model captures the
fact that the modern presidency in a large part drives the legislative agenda (Kernell 1997; Edwards and
Wood 1999; Canes-Wrone 2001), and the president can unilaterally initiate a wide range of policies through
the president’s prerogatives (Moe and Howell 1999; Howell 2003; Howell et al. 2013).
47The veto by P includes any type of P ’s behavior that leads to the non-implementation of the policy,
including but not limited to P ’s formal veto on the legislature’s appropriation bill or P ’s policy sabotage or
delay of the implementation, which leads the policy to remain on paper only, known as the implementation
gap.
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policy is realized and the election follows. In the election, the voter must decide whether to
vote for P or C. Let v ∈ {P,C} denote V ’s choice in the election.
4.2.1 Policy Outcome
Let ω denote the state of the world, where there are two possible states of the world: ω ∈
{p, c}. Let x denote a proposed policy to implement out of two policy options: x ∈ {p, c}.
Let θx denote the common prior that x matches the true state of the world: θx = Pr(x =
ω) ∈ (0, 1).
The outcome of x is determined as follows. If x 6= ω, then x always fails. If x = ω,
there are other factors that affect the likelihood of the success of x: P ’s competence and the
amount of funds provided to implement x. First, in a similar vein of the issue ownership
theory (Petrocik 1996), I assume that P is more competent in implementing p than C,
while C is more competent in implementing c than P . Formally, the probability that c
succeeds is discounted by qp ∈ (0, 1) if P implements c, while there are no such discounts
if P implements p. Thus, the pre-funding probability of the success of p is θp, while the
pre-funding probability of the success of c is (1− θc)qp = θcqp.
Second, the amount of funds provided to implement x affects the probability of its success.
Let ε ≡ 1
n
, where n is a sufficiently large natural number. Let bx denote the amount of funds
for x, where bx ∈ B ≡ {0, ε, 2ε, ..., (n − 1)ε, 1}.48 Here, bx = 1 indicates full funds, while
bx = 0 indicates no funds.
49 That is, the pre-funding probability of the success of x is
discounted by bx ∈ B if x = ω. Thus, the after-funding probability of the success of p is bθp,
48For a technical reason, I assume that B is a set of finite real numbers from 0 to 1. This assumption
about B, however, does not change the key results of the paper, while it enables us to avoid the absence of
an equilibrium amount of funds in some cases, which arises if we instead assume that B is the closed interval
from 0 to 1.
49Another interpretation is that bx = 1 indicates all amounts of funds that are greater than or equal to
a particular amount of funds that does not reduce the likelihood of policy success, while bx = 0 indicates
all fund amounts that are less than or equal to a particular amount of funds that necessarily cause policy
failure.
85
while the after-funding probability of c is bcθcqp, when P implements either policy. To avoid
any confusion in terminology, hereafter, appropriateness refers to the pre-funding probability
of the success of a certain policy and likelihood refers to the after-funding probability of the
success of a certain policy.
4.2.2 Preferences
In terms of each player’s policy preferences, both P and C care about policy benefits. Policy
benefits consist of two parts: intrinsic and extrinsic policy benefits. Intrinsic policy benefits
refer to policy benefits that are materialized by choosing one’s preferred policy regardless of
whether the chosen policy succeeds or fails. Intrinsic policy benefits can be interpreted as
expressive benefits that can be gained by expressing one’s ideology or identity by choosing
a policy (Hillman 2010; Hamlin and Jennings 2011). I assume that p and c each gives the
intrinsic benefits to P and C respectively.50 In my model, only P can enjoy intrinsic policy
benefits because P is the only agenda setter who can choose a policy.51 Let π ∈ (0, 1) denote
P ’s intrinsic policy benefits from choosing p.52
Extrinsic policy benefits, however, refer to policy benefits from the realized outcome of
the implemented policy. Regarding extrinsic policy benefits, all players receive 1 if the im-
plemented policy succeeds, and −1 if the implemented policy fails regardless of the identity
of the policy. They receive 0 if no policy is implemented and the status quo remains. Let
yx ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denote the materialized extrinsic policy benefits from policy x.
In addition to policy benefits, both P and C are assumed to be sufficiently office-
50This is a natural assumption considering the issue ownership theory in the sense that one’s superior
competency in a particular policy comes from the preference for that policy.
51For this reason, I exclude C’s intrinsic policy benefits. Some readers might wonder if the results will be
changed substantively if C also enjoys such intrinsic policy benefits by providing funds to its preferred policy.
The only change by incorporating such intrinsic policy benefits for C is that C is more likely to provide full
funds when C is popular because C’s electoral risk is offset by the intrinsic policy benefits, which does not
substantively change the results. There is no change when P is popular. In this sense, my model is a more
conservative setting for separation of powers to improve the voter’s welfare.
52Below, I discuss the role of π by showing what happens if π → 1 or π → 0
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motivated. P receives αp ∈ (2,∞) if V reelects P , and 0 if V votes for C. Moreover,
C receives αc ∈ (2,∞) only if V votes for the challenger (i.e., v = C), and 0 otherwise.53
The utility function of P takes the following form:




1 if x = p,
0 if x 6= p,
and 1p(v) =

1 if v = P,
0 if v = C.
Similarly, C’s utility function is:




1 if v = C,
0 if v = P.
Finally, V cares about extrinsic policy benefits. In addition, V also enjoys some benefits
β ∈ R++ if V elects a candidate whose valence is greater than the other candidate. Moreover,
V uses the probability that a particular candidate’s policy matches the true state of the world
as the estimate of the candidate’s valence. The interpretation is that V more highly values
53If P and C are not sufficiently office-motivated, then the game is basically the same as a pure policy
experiment in which C provides full funds to maximize the likelihood of the success of a correct policy, and
P accepts to implement the correct policy with full funds.
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the candidate whose competence is more appropriate to the real world. Since V votes after
observing the policy outcome, V uses the posterior beliefs, denoted by θ∗x, in the estimation.
I assume that if both candidate’s valence estimates are the same, V concludes that C’s
valence is greater than P ’s. Then, V ’s utility function is













4.3 No Separation of Powers
Since V cannot affect policy outcome, the optimal choice for V is to choose a candidate




choosing C otherwise. Based on this optimal strategy for V , P can win the election if and
only if θ∗p >
1
2
, while C can win the election if and only if θ∗c ≥ 12 . Given this, the optimal




while C is popular when θc ≥ 12 . With this mind, we turn to the cases of no separation of
powers, where P decides both x and bx.
4.3.1 When P Is Popular




begin the analysis with Lemma 1.
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All proofs are in the Appendix. Lemma 1 allows us to focus only on the case in which p




1 if yp = 1,
θp if yp = 0,
(1−bp)θp
(1−bp)θp+(1−θp) if yp = −1.
From θ∗p =
(1−bp)θp
(1−bp)θp+(1−θp) < θp, we see that V considers bp when V updates the beliefs after
the failure of p. Moreover, it is easy to see that θ∗p decreases as bp increases after the failure
of p, which implies that, with a sufficiently large value of bp > 0, V will believe that p is
not correct if p fails (i.e., θ∗p ≤ 12). That is, if p fails despite sufficient funds, then V believes
that p fails because of incorrect p, not because of insufficient funds. Let b̄p ∈ (0, 1] denote
a threshold value such that, given θp >
1
2
, for all bp ∈ B, (1−bp)θp(1−bp)θp+(1−θp) ≤
1
2
if and only if
bp ≥ b̄p. Call b̄p the persuasion threshold for p in the sense that the failure of p implemented
with any bp ≥ b̄p persuades V to believe that p is not correct.




Recall that P is sufficiently office-motivated, which may lead P to avoid any electoral
risks associated with implementing p by choosing 0 < bp < b̄p. (i.e., playing safe). By
doing so, P can secure reelection even if p fails. Proposition 1 shows that such conjecture
is indeed true, but only when p is appropriate enough for P to overcome P ’s fear of failure
(i.e., θp ≥ 34). This condition comes from P ’s minimally guaranteed utilities. That is, P can
always gain αp + π by choosing p but not implementing it. Therefore, P will implement p










playing safefear of failure
Figure 4.1: The equilibrium amount of funds b∗p at each value of θp, where θp >
1
2 , αp = 2.3. The motive
behind the funding decision is specified in each region.
which holds if and only if θp ≥ 34 . Proposition 1 summarizes these results, which is visualized
in Figure 1.
Proposition 1: Suppose θp >
1
2
and there is no separation of powers.
(i) If θp ≥ 34 , then P implements p with b
∗
p = max{bp ∈ B|bp < b̄p}.
(ii) Otherwise, P chooses p but does not implement it.
4.3.2 When C Is Popular
I turn to the cases in which C is popular (i.e., θc ≥ 12). Recall that V will vote for C
if no policy is implemented. Now, P ’s competence in implementing c (i.e., qp) affects the
appropriateness of policy reform c. We can find a threshold value b̄c ∈ (0, 1] such that the
failure of c implemented with any bc > b̄c leads V to believes that c is not correct. Call such
b̄c the persuasion threshold for c.




If qp is sufficiently low (i.e., q < 2 − 1θc ), V always attributes the failure of c to P ’s
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incompetence, which implies that V will vote for the challenger regardless of the outcome
of c. Proposition 2 states the optimal strategy for P in such cases in which P is sufficiently
incompetent in implementing c.




(i) If θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp , then P implements p with full funds.
(ii) If θc >
1+αp
2+αp
and θcqp ≥ 1+π2 , then P implements c with full funds.
(iii) Otherwise, P chooses p but does not implement it.
Proposition 2 generally states that P always provides bx = 1 once P decides to implement
either policy (i.e., gambling on success). This is because P does not have any electoral risks
associated with implementing any policy. As captured in the first part of Proposition 2, P
may see that p is sufficiently appropriate to implement. In this case, the failure of p does
not cause any additional damage to P ’s electoral prospects because P is doomed to lose
the election if no policy is implemented. Moreover, if p succeeds, then P can gain not only
policy benefits but also office benefits because the success of p will persuade V to vote for
P . Therefore, gambling on success with p is optimal for P .
Similarly, the second part of Proposition 2 states that if P sees that c is more appropriate
than p in terms of achieving success, then gambling on success with c is optimal for P . Since
the failure of c does not change V ’s voting decision, P does not gain anything from the
failure of c. Hence, the only way for P to maximize utilities is to increase the likelihood of
the success of c by providing bc = 1.
The third part of Proposition 2 depicts the cases in which neither p nor c is appropriate
enough for P to overcome his fear of failure. In such cases, P chooses p but refrains from
implementing it. This is because P can gain the intrinsic policy benefits but also safely abort
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its implementation.54 This case is somewhat interesting because we see that P refrains him-
self from implementing the wrong policy from V ’s perspective even if there is no separation
of powers.
Now, consider the cases in which P ’s competence qp is sufficiently high (i.e., qp ≥ 2− 1θc ).
With sufficient funds, the failure of c now persuades V that p is correct, which leads V to
vote for P .




(i) If αp < 2 + 2π and θc <
π+4−αp
6−αp , then P implements p with full funds.
(ii) Otherwise, P implements c with b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c}.
The first part of Proposition 3 states that if P ’s office-motivation is moderate and the
appropriateness of p is sufficiently high, then P implements p with full funds to maximize
the likelihood of the success of p. That is, P gambles on success with p. In particular, it is
easy to see that P ’s gambling on success with p will be more likely to happen as the intrinsic
policy benefits of P (i.e., π) becomes greater than the given αp.
Notice that the second part of Proposition 3 states that P ’s strong office-motivation
leads P to gamble on failure with c, that is, P always implements c with the minimum
amount of funds that leads to the persuasion after the policy failure if P sufficiently cares
about reelection (i.e., αp ≥ 2 + 2π). Since P gambles on failure, P wants to decrease the
likelihood of the success of c as much as possible by reducing the amount of funds but also
at the same time P must provide more than b̄c to persuade V after the failure of c. Such
gambling on failure by P still prevails even if P is somewhat moderately office-motivated
(i.e., αp < 2 + 2π), but the likelihood of the success of p is too low (i.e., θp ≤ 2−π6−αp or,
54This case may capture P ’s delaying or sabotage on the implementation of p rather than the unnatural
situation where P proposes funds and vetoes P ’s own proposal.
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p 1 (full funds) 2θp − 1
θp ≤ 12 and θcqp ≥
1
2
c 1 (full funds) 2θcqp − 1
θp ≤ 12 and θcqp <
1
2
political stalemate 0 (no funds) 0
Table 4.1: The optimal policy to implement, optimal amount of funds, and consequent optimal welfare
level of V given the appropriateness of each policy
equivalently, θc ≥ 4−αp+π6−αp ). That is, it is easier for P to show the failure of c than the success
of p. We are now ready to examine the consequences of P ’s optimal choices on V ’ welfare.
4.4 The Voter’s Welfare without Separation of Powers
It is natural to measure V ’s welfare in terms of her ex-ante expected benefits from a certain
policy, which is determined by the likelihood of the success of the policy. Given this, a
policy that is considered more appropriate by V should be implemented to maximize V ’s
welfare. However, even if a certain policy is deemed more appropriate by V , it is better not to
implement any policy than to implement the more appropriate policy if the appropriateness
of the more appropriate policy is not sufficiently high. Therefore, to maximize V ’s welfare, p
should be implemented only if θp >
1
2
, while c is implemented only if θcqp ≥ 12 . The additional
requirement for maximizing V is that a policy that meets the first two requirements must be
implemented by full funds. Table 1 shows the optimal policy to implement, optimal amount
of funds, and consequent optimal welfare level of V given the appropriateness of each policy.
Then, there are three types of the sub-optimality according to its origin. First, sub-
optimality can be caused by underfunding the optimal policy. Call this an underfunding
sub-optimality. The second type of sub-optimality is the result of implementing a wrong
policy that is different from the optimal policy choice (including non-implementation) from
V ’s perspective. Call this a wrong-policy sub-optimality. Third, sub-optimality can be
caused by a political stalemate when the implementation of a correct policy with full funds
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is optimal for V , which I call a gridlock sub-optimality.
4.4.1 When P Is Popular
When P is popular, the absence of separation of powers causes either a gridlock or an




not implement p because of P ’s fear of failure, which results in a gridlock sub-optimality.
When θp ≥ 34 , P ’s electoral concerns drive P to play safe to avoid the electoral risks associated
with implementing p, which causes an underfunding sub-optimality. Although P and V ’s
preferences are aligned in terms of policy choice and, therefore, there is no problem of the
abuse of powers by P in choosing a wrong policy, electoral competition ironically leads P to
under-fund, thereby reducing V ’s welfare.
4.4.2 When C Is Popular
In the cases in which C is popular, Figure 2 is a typical example that visualizes Propositions
2 and 3. In the area below the thick diagonal line that represents all points where qp = 2− 1θr ,
and there is no persuasion after the failure of c regardless of the amount of funds due to
P ’s sufficiently low competency. The area above the same line represents the cases where
the failure of c can persuade V if c was implemented with funds greater than the persuasion
threshold for c. The dashed curve represents all points where θcqp =
1
2
, which I call the
appropriateness curve for c. As shown in Table 1, V ’s welfare is maximized by implementing
c with full funds in the area above and on the appropriateness curve, while the optimal level of
V ’s welfare can be achieved by non-implementation of any policy (i.e., a political stalemate)
in the area below the appropriateness curve. Then, we can see how the equilibrium pairs of
the implemented policy and the amount of funds in various cases we specified in Proposition



































The motive behind the funding decision (the equilibrium amount of funds):
L1: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1)
L2: Fear of failure (political stalemate)
L3: Fear of failure (political stalemate)
L4: Gambling on success with c (b∗c = 1)
H1: Gambling on failure with c (b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c})
H2: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1)
H3: Gambling on failure with c (b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c})
H4: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1)
Figure 4.2: Welfare of V when C is popular (i.e., θc ≥ 12 ) without separation of powers (setting αp = 2.7
and π = 0.4). The dashed curve represents the appropriateness curve (i.e., all points where θcqp =
1
2 ). The
thick diagonal line represents all points where qp = 2− 1θc .
Let me turn to the region below the thick diagonal line in Figure 2, in which the failure
of c never persuades V because of P ’s incompetency in implementing c. Recall that the only
way for P to win the election is to show the success of p, not to show the failure of c in this
case. This region is partitioned into the four subregions, labeled from L1 to L4.
Notice that two subregions (i.e., L1 and L2) are located below the appropriateness curve,
which implies that the optimal welfare can be achieved only by political stalemate (i.e., non-
implementation) in these subregions. Among these two subregions, the optimal level of V ’s
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welfare is attained only in L2. In L2, P certainly knows that what makes c inappropriate to
implement is not c’s low probability of being correct but P ’s incompetency, which implies
that the probability that p succeeds is also very low. Given this, P knows that the chances for
re-election through the success of p are very slim, which leads P to focus on policy benefits.
Since the appropriateness of p is not high enough for P to overcome the fear of failure, P
chooses p but does not implement it.
Yet, this logic also implies that P would be willing to implement p to show its success,
thereby winning the election, if the probability of p is somewhat high. Of course, P will
provide full funds to maximize the likelihood of the success of p because P gambles on
success in this case. This is why the wrong-policy sub-optimality arises in L1. Moreover, we





= 1), which means a higher θc is required to eliminate P ’s fear of failure that
causes the wrong-policy sub-optimality as P becomes more strongly office-motivated. This
clearly shows the cases in which electoral competition actually reduces V ’s welfare.
In contrast to L2, we see that a political stalemate causes the gridlock sub-optimality
in L3. Since L3 is above the appropriateness curve, the optimal level of V ’s welfare can be
attained by implementing c with full funds. However, P ’s fear of failure leads P to seek the
guaranteed intrinsic policy benefits from p (i.e., π) from a political stalemate rather than to
seek the uncertain extrinsic policy benefits from c. Notice that the political stalemate and
its consequent gridlock sub-optimality is not caused by P ’s electoral concerns or the absence
of separation of powers. Rather, it is caused by the existence of π that requires c to be
more appropriate (i.e., θcqp ≥ 1+π2 ) for P to overcome his fear of failure. Below, I show that
imposing separation of powers cannot address this gridlock sub-optimality. The only way to
mitigate the sub-optimality is to reduce π, because, as shown in Figure 2, L3 shrinks as P ’s
intrinsic policy benefits from p decreases. In other words, the border between L3 and L4








Finally, we see that V ’s welfare is maximized in L4. Moreover, V ’s welfare level here
is greater than the optimal level attained in L2 (see Table 1). One immediate implication
from this observation is that achieving the highest welfare level requires a sufficiently high
appropriateness of c (i.e., θcqp ≥ 12), which leads P to overcome the fear of failure. This,
in turn, naturally leads P to gamble on success with c, which results in the optimal welfare
level.
Next, In the area above the thick diagonal line in Figure 2, P is sufficiently competent in
implementing c. Recall that P now can win by showing either the success of p or the failure
of c implemented with sufficiently large funds. As shown in Figure 2, P sees that showing
the failure of c is easier than the success of p in most cases (i.e., H1 and H3) because the
appropriateness of c will be discounted by P ’s incompetency in implementing c. In addition,
P can discount the appropriateness of policy more by providing somewhat little funds. Such
gambling on failure with c by P results in suboptimal welfare levels in both H1 and H3.
However, the type of the sub-optimality in each subregion is different. While there is a
underfunding sub-optimality in H1 because V ’s welfare can be maximized by implementing
c with full funds, there is a wrong-policy sub-optimality in H3 because non-implementation
is the only way to attain the optimal welfare level. Again, these two cases also clearly show
that P ’s electoral concerns produce harmful effects on V ’s welfare.
Finally, H2 and H4 show that π leads P to gamble on success with p if P is not sufficiently
office-motivated (i.e., αp ≤ 2 + 2π), which causes a wrong-policy sub-optimality in those
subregions. To see why, notice that H2 and H4 will disappear if there are no intrinsic policy




and αp > 2 + 2π). However, even if P cannot
gain any intrinsic policy benefits from p, the optimal level of V ’s welfare is not achieved
because H2 and H4 will be merged respectively to H1 and H3.
Overall, we see that there are several subregions in which a suboptimal welfare level is
attained. To obtain the optimal welfare level, a political stalemate (i.e., non-implementation)
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is necessary in H3, H4, and L1, while c should be implemented with full funds in H1, H2,
and L3 in Figure 2. Naturally, we may ask if imposing separation of powers can lead to such
changes in funding decision, thereby improving V ’s welfare, which is examined now.
4.5 Imposing Separation of Powers
The only change in the model caused by imposing separation of powers is that C now
determines the amount of funds, which renders the model into a take-it-or-leave-it game





4.5.1 When P Is Popular
Lemma 1 allows us to focus only on C’s funding decision after p is chosen by P . When P
is popular, the only way for C to win the election is to gamble on failure with p, that is,
showing the failure of p, thereby persuading V to vote for C. Therefore, the first condition
for C’s electoral victory is, of course, the failure of p, which makes C want to provide as
little funds as possible to minimize the likelihood of the success of p. Yet, at the same time,
C must provide at least as much funds as the persuasion threshold for p. Furthermore,
C also provides funds that are large enough for P to overcome the fear of failure, thereby
implementing p. This is because P does not need to implement p to win the election. That
means, P implements p as long as the likelihood of the success of p is high enough to overcome
P ’s fear of failure. Lemma 2 states P ’s optimal strategy.








(ii) If bp < b̄p, then P implements p if and only if
3
4
≤ θp < 1+αp2+αp
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(iii) Otherwise, P chooses p but does not implement it regardless of bp.
The first part of Lemma 2 states that P is willing to implement p despite the electoral risks
associated with its implementation only when the appropriateness of p is sufficiently high,
and the amount of funds is sufficiently large. If p is not sufficiently appropriate, P will not
implement p if there are electoral risks associated with its implementation (the second part
of Lemma 2), or P will not implement p whatsoever regardless of the amount of funds (the
third part of Lemma 2). Given such P ’s optimal strategy, C will choose the optimal decision,
which, in turn, determines the equilibrium outcome.




(i) If θp ≥ 1+αp2+αp , then p is implemented with b
∗









, then p is implemented with b∗p = max{bp ∈ B|bp < b̄p}.
(iii) If θp ≤ 34 , then p is chosen by P but never implemented.
The first part of Proposition 4 describes the equilibrium outcome where C gambles on fail-
ure with p. In this case, C must provide the minimal funds sufficient to persuade V after the




The second part of Proposition 4 states that C’s optimal funding decision is to provide funds
less than the persuasion threshold for p when 3
4
≤ θp < 1+αp2+αp . In this case, P ’s firm decision
to play safe forces C to give up any attempt to affect C’s electoral prospects through policy
outcome. However, unlike the third case of Proposition 4 where P does not implement p
whatsoever, P is now open to implementing p if there are no electoral risks associated with
its implementation. Since C also believes that p is correct, C wants to provide funds that
leads P to implement p, that is, bp < b̄p. Moreover, since extrinsic policy benefits from the
success of p is the only way for C to gain positive utilities, C now wants to maximize the
likelihood of the success of p. Therefore, the equilibrium amount of funds determined by
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C is b∗p = max{bp ∈ B|bp < b̄p}. Finally, the third part of Proposition 4 depicts the case
in which the appropriateness of c is not enough to lead P to overcome the fear of failure,
therefore, P does not implement p regardless of bp.
4.5.2 When C Is Popular
In the cases in which C is popular, θc ≥ 12 . Recall that P can win the election by showing
either the success of p or the failure of c. However, C does not have any incentive to
implement p because there is no need to persuade V by showing the failure of p. Moreover,
C wants to block the implementation of p because it is wrong.
Lemma 3: Suppose that there is separation of powers. C always blocks p (i.e., b∗p = 0) if P
chooses p.
Lemma 3 states that C will block p in the sense of Madisonian checks and balances. The
immediate implication from Lemma 3 is that P ’s choices are reduced to whether to choose
c and implement it or to choose p that will be blocked by C, which means that P cannot
affect his electoral prospects by showing the success of p. Therefore, P chooses p if and only
if P sees c is not likely to succeed. As in the previous section, the likelihood of the success
of c is affected by P ’s competency in handling c.
Consider the cases in which P ’s competence is so low that the failure of c does not
persuade V to vote for P (i.e., qp < 2− 1θc ).




(i) If θcqp ≥ 1+π2 , then C provides full funds and P chooses and implements c.
(ii) Otherwise, P chooses p and C blocks it (i.e., b∗c = 0).
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. Since C does not have any electoral risks
associated with the implementation of c, C’s funding decision is basically the same as the
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pure policy experiment in which only the appropriateness of c matters (i.e., θrqp). Thus,
it is in C’s best interest to provide full funds to c if the appropriateness of c is at least 1
2
.
Meanwhile, there is no way for P to avoid his electoral defeat because the failure of c does not
persuade V and P cannot show the success of p by Lemma 3. Hence, if P wants to implement
c, then P prefers full funds because the success of c is the only way for P to gain positive
utilities. Therefore, c will be implemented with full funds. The question here is regarding
when P prefers the implementation of c. The expected utilities from implementing c with
full funds is greater than or equal to π if θrqp ≥ 1+π2 . Therefore, P chooses and implements
c with full funds if θrqp ≥ 1+π2 , while P seeks the intrinsic policy benefits from choosing p
otherwise.
Next, I examine the cases in which P ’s competence in implementing c is sufficiently high
so that P can win the election by showing the failure of c. There are electoral risks associated
with the implementation of c for C if the amount of funds is greater than the persuasion
threshold of c.




(i) If θc ≥ 3+π4 , then c is implemented with b
∗
c = max{bc ∈ B|bc ≤ b̄c}.
(ii) If θc <
3+π
4
and θcqp ≥ 1+αc2+αc , then C provides full funds and P chooses and implements
c.
(iii) Otherwise, P chooses p and C blocks it (i.e., b∗c = 0).
The first part of Proposition 6 describes C’s choice of playing safe with c due to the
electoral risks associated with its implementation. That is, C wants to implement c with
the largest amount of funds that does not lead the failure of c to persuade V . Yet, again, C
must entice P into implementing c with the chosen amount of funds. Although the amount
of funds is not large enough for the failure of c to persuade V , it is still better than non-




. Hence, C can play safe as long as the following inequality holds: 1+π
2θcqp
≤ b̄c, which




that is, choosing b∗c = max{bc ∈ B|bc ≤ b̄c}.
The second part of Proposition 6 is where C cannot play safe but the likelihood of the
success of c is high enough for C to gamble on success with c if full funds are provided. In
such cases, the appropriateness of c is already so high that P sees that showing the failure
of c is unlikely. However, as shown in Proposition 3, it is still better for P to gamble on
failure with c than to satisfy with the intrinsic policy benefits from p. Therefore, P is also
willing to gamble on failure with c with full funds. Finally, the last part of Proposition 6
describes the cases in which C prefers a political stalemate to the implementation of c with
any amount of funds, in which C’s fear of failure leads C to block any policy by providing no
funds. Knowing this, it is optimal for P to choose p because P can gain the intrinsic policy
benefits by doing so.
4.6 Welfare Effects of Separation of Powers
In this section, I present V ’s welfare under separation of powers. It would be a more efficient
and natural way to present the results by focusing on how separation of powers changes V ’s
welfare under the setting without separation of powers.
4.6.1 When P Is Popular
In the cases in which P is popular, Figure 3 visualizes Propositions 1 and 4. The red dashed
line represents the equilibrium amounts of funds when there is no separation of powers (i.e.,
Proposition 1), while the blue line represents the equilibrium amounts of funds when there is
separation of powers (i.e., Proposition 4). When the appropriateness of p is sufficiently large












playing safe by P
↓
gambling on failure by Cno change
Figure 4.3: The equilibrium amounts of funds b∗p at each value of θp, where θp >
1
2 , αp = 2.3. The red
dashed line represents the equilibrium amounts of funds when there is no separation of powers. The blue line
represents the equilibrium amounts of funds when there is separation of powers. The change in the motive
behind the funding decision is specified in each region.
case, separation of powers improves V ’s welfare by moving the power of the purse from P ,
who wants to play safe to avoid the electoral risks, to C, who is willing to gamble on failure
with p to win the election. In other words, this result clearly demonstrates that separation
of powers can improve V ’s welfare by mitigating the malign effects of electoral competition
(i.e., underfunding), which is an obviously different mechanism from Madisonian checks and
balances such as blocking a wrong policy. In particular, we see that separation of powers
attains the optimal level of V ’s welfare when θp =
1+αp
2+αp
, which maximizes the gap between
the two equilibrium amounts of funds. This is because only full funds can lead P to overcome
the fear of failure when the appropriateness of p is on P ’s appropriateness cutoff point (i.e.,
1+αp
2+αp
), which, in turn, leads C to provide full funds.
However, such welfare improvement by separation of powers is not universal. As shown




p is implemented with the same amount of funds is provided when 3
4
≤ θp < 1+αp2+αp because





, which means that separation of powers cannot eliminate P ’s fear of failure, thereby
causing a political stalemate. In addition, we see that the region where separation of powers
improves V ’s welfare shrinks as P becomes more office-motivated (i.e., as αp increases).
4.6.2 When C Is Popular
In the cases where C is popular, Figure 4 visualizes Propositions 2, 3, 5, and 6. The blue
subregions (i.e., H1c, H2, H3, H4, and L1) represent where separation of powers improves
V ’s welfare. The red subregions (i.e., H1a and H1b) represent where separation of powers
reduces V ’s welfare. The white subregions (i.e., L2, L3, and L4) represent where separation
of powers does not change V ’s welfare. Recall that the optimal level of V ’s welfare can be
maximized by doing nothing when P is not sufficiently competent in implementing c (i.e.,
the area below the appropriateness curve in Figure 4). Given this, the most notable change
caused by separation of powers is that C blocks the implementation of p (i.e., L1, L2, H3,
and H4), thereby attaining the optimal level of V ’s welfare. Consequently, we see welfare
improvement in L1, H3, and H4, which is consistent with the basic idea of separation of
powers: checks and balances.
Regarding such a welfare-improving political stalemate, the interesting case arises in H2.
Since H2 is above the appropriateness curve, V ’s welfare can be optimized by implementing
c with full funds. Yet, P ’s choice of p makes it impossible. Given this, the best way to
increase V ’s welfare is simply to block the implementation of p. Therefore, although the
government appears to be dysfunctional in the sense that it fails to implement the correct
policy (i.e., c) on its face, it would be premature to conclude so because the worst outcome
(i.e., implementing p with full funds) is avoided by a political stalemate.
In the area above the appropriateness curve, V ’s welfare can be optimized by implement-
ing c with full funds. This area, which is equivalent to H1 under no separation of powers,











































The change of the motive behind the funding decision (the equilibrium amount of funds):
L1: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1) → Checks and balances (political stalemate)
L2: Fear of failure (political stalemate) → Checks and balances (political stalemate)
L3: Fear of failure (political stalemate) → Checks and balances (political stalemate)
L4: Gambling on success with c (b∗c = 1) → Gambling on success with c (b∗c = 1)
H1: Gambling on failure with c (b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c})
→ Fear of failure (political stalemate) in H1a
→ Gambling on success with c (b∗c = 1) in H1c
→ Playing safe with c (b∗c = max{bc ∈ B|bc ≤ b̄c}) in H1b
H2: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1) → Checks and balances (political stalemate)
H3: Gambling on failure with c (b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c})
→ Checks and balances (political stalemate)
H4: Gambling on success with p (b∗p = 1) → Checks and balances (political stalemate)
Figure 4.4: Example of V ’s welfare changes caused by imposing separation of powers when C is popular
(setting αp = 2.7 and π = 0.4). The blue regions represent where separation of powers improves V ’s welfare.
The red regions represent where separation of powers reduces V ’s welfare. The white regions represent where
separation of powers does not change V ’s welfare. The change of the motive behind the funding decision
and its consequent equilibrium amount of funds is written in blue if there is welfare improvement, in red if
there is welfare loss, and in black if there is no welfare change.
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causes the gridlock sub-optimality in H1a, which worsens V ’s welfare. Although it seems
that C justifiably blocks P ’s wrong choice of p on its face, the blame for the political stale-
mate should go to C, not P . That is, knowing that C’s fear of failure leads C to block
the implementation of any policy, P chooses p to gain the intrinsic policy benefits from p.
In fact, P would gamble on failure with c if it were not for separation of powers, as shown
in Proposition 3. Hence, unlike H2 in which a political stalemate improves V ’s welfare, a
political stalemate in H1a indicates a dysfunctional government, thereby welfare loss.
Separation of powers worsens V ’s welfare in H1b, too. In this subregion, C’s responsibil-
ity for the welfare loss appears more clearly because the welfare loss is the direct consequence
of the change of the motive behind the funding decision: from P ’s gambling of failure to
C’s playing safe. Overall, both H1a and H1b clearly demonstrate that separation of powers
aggravates the malign effects of electoral competition on V ’s welfare rather than mitigating
them.
Then, when does separation of powers mitigate the malign effects of electoral compe-
tition? In H1c, separation of powers improves V ’s welfare up to the optimal level. More
specifically, separation of powers changes the motive behind the funding decision from P ’s
gambling on failure to C’s gambling on success with c. Notice that P gambles on failure
with c in H1c. As such, separation of powers and both parties’ electoral motivations work
together to attain the optimal level of V ’s welfare by leading both C and P to be willing to
gamble on different sides of a policy outcome: success for C and failure for P .










= 1). This suggests an interesting role of P ’s fear of failure in improving V ’s welfare.
Notice that π is positively related to the magnitude of P ’s fear of failure. If π increases,
then P ’s fear of failure increases, which requires a higher likelihood of the success of c for
P to overcome the fear of failure. Since full funds are already provided in L4, the only way
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to compensate for P ’s increased fear of failure is to increase the appropriateness of c. This
is why L4 shrinks as π increases. However, in H1b, C is providing funds in an amount that
is less than the persuasion threshold for c, which implies that C can provide larger funds to
compensate for the increase in P ’s fear of failure if π increases. Moreover, P can overcome
the fear of failure only if P can expect reelection if c fails. Therefore, C must gamble on
success, thereby providing full funds. This is why H1c expands as π increases. Then, we
reach a counter-intuitive conclusion that P ’s preferential bias to a particular policy does not
necessarily damage V ’s welfare. Such preferential bias may be leveraged by P to induce C
to provide full funds, that is, expanding H1c.
Overall, we see that separation of powers weakly improves the voter’s welfare by moving
the power of the purse to one who is willing to provide larger funds to win the election.
Specifically, when P is popular, giving the power of the purse to C weakly improves the
voter’s welfare because C is more willing to provide larger funds to change V ’s initial belief
by showing the failure of p. When C is popular, the welfare effects of separation of powers
are nuanced. Although separation of powers successfully prevents the implementation of a
wrong policy, it does not necessarily increase the amount of funds to a correct policy. The
welfare effects of separation of powers depend on C’s motive behind the funding decision:
whether fear of failure, playing safe, or gambling on success.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Separation of powers can improve voters’ welfare by mitigating the malign effects of electoral
competition: the incumbent president’s underfunding to avoid the electoral risks associated
with policy implementation. More specifically, voters’ welfare can be improved if separation
of powers moves the power of the purse to the onw who has a funding motive to provide
larger funds, and the amount of funds increases as the motive of funding changes from fear
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of failure to playing safe to gambling on failure to gambling on success. However, this logic
also implies that separation of powers can reduce voters’ welfare if the challenger has a
funding motive to provide smaller funds than the incumbent president. This finding clearly
shows that the welfare effects of separation of powers should be examined with its interaction
with electoral competition because the motive of a funding decision is mostly determined by
policymakers’ electoral concerns.
In addition, the model demonstrates that careful attention is necessary when we interpret
normative implications of a political stalemate. If a political stalemate is the result of the
policy makers’ fear of failure, then such a political stalemate may be interpreted as the sign
of a dysfunctional government. However, if a political stalemate comes from checks and
balances to block the implementation of a wrong policy, then it should be interpreted that
the government actually functions well in preventing us from falling into a worse state. This
finding suggests that the normative implications of a political stalemate are more nuanced
than we expected.
The model also speaks to the recent debate over separation of powers. Howell and
Moe (2016) claimed that empowering the president is necessary to make the government
more effective in solving national problems. They specifically suggested giving the fast-track
authority to the president over domestic policy as the president has over foreign policy. This
is exactly what the model depicts: the incumbent president chooses a policy in the beginning.
In fact, Howell and Moe simply take a strong assumption that is widely accepted in foreign
policy: that the president’s policy is always more likely to be correct. Even if we accept the
strong assumption, the model shows that separation of powers is weakly better for voters’
welfare (see Figure 3). Moreover, the model also shows that political stalemate can arise due
to the president’s fear of failure even if there is no separation of powers. This result clearly
suggests that separation of powers should be preserved at least over funding decisions if we
decide to empower the president to enhance the effectiveness of the government.
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However, it is still debatable whether the strong assumption can be applied to domestic
policy.If not, the model shows that it is not certain that empowering the president necessarily
improves voters’ welfare. If we give funding power to the president in addition to the power
to initiate policy, we are surely exposed to the risk that the president will implement a wrong
policy with full funds. However, if we retain the power of the purse of the legislature, then
sometimes the legislature may play safe or even block any policy out of fear of failure. It
is hard to provide a one-size-fits-all solution to this problem, but this paper facilitates a
productive debate about an appropriate institutional design to address such possible welfare
loss.
4.8 Appendix




. P can gain at least αp +π by choosing policy p (i.e., P chooses policy p but
not implementing it). The expected payoff from choosing policy c is bθcqp+(1−bθcqp)(αp−1).
Then, P never chooses policy c if 1 + π ≥ (2− αp)bθcqp, which always holds because of the
assumption that αp > 2. 2




. By Lemma 1, P never chooses policy c. Hence, we restrict our attention
to the cases in which P chooses policy reform p. P can gain at least αp + π by choosing
policy p but not implementing it. If bp ≥ b̄p, then P ’s expected payoff from implementing
policy p is (2 + αp)bpθp − 1 + π. It is easy to see that P can maximize the expected payoff
by providing bp = 1. Thus, P ’s maximized expected payoff is (2 + αp)θp − 1 + π. If bp < b̄p,
then P ’s expected payoff is 2bpθp+αp−1+π. Then, the expected payoff from implementing
policy p with bp < b̄p is always greater than the expected payoff from implementing policy p





< b̄p, such bp always exists. Therefore, if
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P implements policy p, then it must be that b∗p = max{bp ∈ B|bp < b̄P}. Finally, the payoff
form implementing policy p with b∗p is equal to or greater than αp + π if and only if θp ≥ 34 .
Since the expected payoff from implementing policy p with b < b∗p is always less than the





Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose θp ≤ 12 and qp <
1
2
. P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy p is (2 +
αp)bpθp − 1 + π. P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy c is 2bcθcqp − 1. Since the
expected payoffs in both cases are increasing in bx, P can maximize the expected payoff by
providing bp = bc = 1. P ’s expected payoff from initiating policy p but not implementing it
is π. Thus, it is better for P to implement policy p than not implementing it if θp ≤ 1+αp2+αp .
Then, it is easy to see that P will implement policy c with full funds if and only if θcqp ≥
(2+αp)(1−θc)+π
2











θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp , which implies that θcqp ≥
(2+αp)(1−θc)+π
2
does not hold when θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp by the
assumption that αc > 2. Therefore, P will implement policy c with full funds if and only if
θcqp ≥ 1+π2 if θc >
1+αp
2+αp




and θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp . Otherwise, P chooses policy p but does not implement
it. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose θp ≤ 12 and qp ≥
1
2
. P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy c with bc > b̄c
is αp − 1 + bcθcqp(2 − αp). Since this expected payoff is decreasing in bc, P can maximize
the expected payoff by providing bc = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c}. Then, the maximized expected
payoff is 4θc − 3 + 2αp(1 − θc) − η, where η : N → R+ is a mapping from n to a certain
non-negative real number. P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy c with bc ≤ b̄c is
2bcθcqp− 1, which must be less than 4θc− 3. Since θc < 1 and we can set a sufficiently small
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number n that can make η small enough to make 4θc − 3 + 2αp(1− θc)− η > 2bcθcqp − 1, it
must be that P provides bc = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c} if P implements policy c.
P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy reform p is bpθp(2 +αp)− 1 + π. Since the
expected payoff is increasing in bp, the maximized expected payoff is θp(2 +αp)− 1 + π. P ’s
expected payoff from choosing policy p but implementing it is π. Recall that θp = 1 − θc.
Thus, it is better for P to implement policy p than not to implement it if θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp .
Consider the cases in which θc ≤ 1+αp2+αp . P implements policy c with b
∗
c = min{bc ∈
B|bc > b̄c} only if (6 − αp)θc ≥ π + 4 − αp, which always hold if αp ≥ π + 4. If αp <






αp ≥ 2 + 2π, then we have π+4−αp6−αp <
1
2
≤ θc, which implies that P implements policy c with
b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c}. Therefore, P implements policy reform p with full funds if and
only if αp < 2 + 2π and θc <
π+4−αp




policy c with b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c} only if θc ≤
2αp−π−3
2αp−4 . Since θc < 1 ≤
2αp−π−3
2αp−4 , P
always implements policy c with b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c}. In conclusion, the president
implements policy reform p with full funds if αp < 2 + 2π and θc <
π+4−αp
6−αp . Otherwise, the
president always implements policy reform c with b∗c = min{bc ∈ B|bc > b̄c}. 2




. By Lemma 1, P never initiates policy reform r. Hence, we restrict our
attention to the cases in which P initiates policy reform p. P can gain at least αp + π by
initiating policy reform p but not implementing it. If bl ≥ b̄l, then P ’s expected payoff from
implementing policy p is (2 + αp)bpθp − 1 + π. Therefore, P accepts C’s funding decision if
bp ≥ 1+αp(2+αp)θp . If θp <
1+αp
2+αp
, then P accepts C’s funding decision only if bp > 1, a contradiction




bp < b̄p, then P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy reform p is 2bθp − 1 + αp + π.
Thus, P prefers to implement policy p with bp < b̄ if and only if bp ≥ 12θp . Since we assume
that bp < b̄p = 2− 1θp , it must be that
1
2θp





Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the cases in which θp ≥ 1+αp2+αp . If bp < b̄p, C’s expected payoff from implementing
policy p is 2bpθp − 1. If bp ≥ b̄p, C’s expected payoff from implementing policy p is (2 −
αc)bpθp− 1 + αc. Hence, C always prefers to provide bp ≥ b̄p rather than bp < b̄p. C receives
0 if the status quo remains. Hence, C prefers to implement policy reform p with bp ≥ b̄p
if bp <
1−αc
(2−αc)θp , which always holds because
1−αc
(2−αc)θp > 1. Since C’s expected payoff from
implementing policy p with bp ≥ b̄p is decreasing in bp, C provides b∗p = min{bp ∈ B|bp ≥
max{b̄p, 1+αp(2+αp)θp}}, which leads P to implement policy reform p by Lemma 2.
Consider the cases in which θp <
1+αp
2+αp
. Now, P does not implement policy p if bp ≥ b̄p.
Hence, the only option for C to implement policy p is to provide bp < b̄p. C prefers to
implement policy p with bp < b̄p rather than the status quo if and only if bp ≥ 12θp . Then,
1
2θp
≤ bp < 2 − 1θp holds only when θp >
3
4
. Since this condition is exactly same as the
condition in which P prefers to implement policy p with bp < b̄p, P implements policy p.
Note that C’s expected payoff from implementing policy p with bp < b̄p is increasing in bp,
thereby b∗p = max{bp ∈ B|bp < b̄p}. 2




. C’s expected payoff from implementing policy p is bp(1− θp) + (1− bp(1−
θp))(αc− 1), while its expected payoff from blocking policy p is αc. Then, C prefers to block
policy p if bp(2− αc)(1− θp) < 1, which always holds since αc > 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose θc ≥ 12 and qp < 2 −
1
θc
. By Lemma 2, P receives π by initiating policy p. P ’s




and θcqp ≥ 1+π2 .
C’s expected payoff from implementing policy c is 2bcθcqp − 1 + αc. Since the expected
payoff is increasing in bc, C can maximize the expected payoff by choosing bc = 1 and will
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receive 2θcqp − 1 + αc. Since C can receive at least αc by choosing bc = 0, C provides full
funds if and only if 1 ≥ 1
2θcqp
, which requires θcqp ≥ 12 .





, which, in turn,
satisfies bc = 1 ≥ 1+π2θcqp , which leads P to implement policy c. Otherwise, if P chooses policy
c, then either C provides bc = 0 or P does not implement policy c. Consequently, P receives
0 in both cases. Thus, P initiates policy p because, by Lemma 3, P can receives π by
initiating policy p. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose θc ≥ 12 and qp ≥ 2 −
1
2θc
. P ’s expected payoff from implementing policy c with
bc ≤ b̄c is 2bcθcqp − 1, while the expected payoff from implementing policy c with bc > b̄c is
(2−αp)bcθcqp−1+αp. By Lemma 3, P ’s payoff from choosing policy p is π. Then, P prefers
to implements policy c with bc ≤ b̄c rather than the status quo if bc ≥ 1+π2(θcqp) . Since we
assume bc ≤ b̄c, it must be that 1+π2θcqp ≤ b̄c, which requires θc ≥
3+π
4
. P prefers to implement
policy c with bc > b̄c if bc ≤ 1−αp+π(2−αp)θcqp . Since 1 <
1−αp+π
(2−αp)θcqp , P always implements policy c if
bc > b̄r. Otherwise, P initiates policy p to gain π.
C’s expected payoff from implementing policy c with bc ≤ b̄c is 2bcθcqp − 1 + αc. Since
the expected payoff is increasing in bc, C can maximize its payoff by providing bc = b̄c and
its maximized payoff is 4θc − 3 + αp. C’s payoff with bc > b̄c is (2 + αc)bcθcqp − 1, which
is maximized by providing bc = 1. C’s maximized payoff in this case is (2 + αc)θcqp − 1.
C can safely receive at least αc if C provides zero funds to either policy. Hence, C prefers
to implement policy c with bc = b̄c rather than the status quo if and only if θcqp ≥ 34 ,
while C prefers to implement policy c with bc = 1 rather than the status quo if and only
if θcqp ≥ 1+αc2+αc >
3
4
. In addition, C prefers to implement with full funds rather than with
bc = b̄c if and only if θcqp ≥ 2(2θc−1)+αc2+αc . Moving θc from the left-hand side to the right-hand
side, we have qp ≥ 2(2θc−1)+αc(2+αc)θc . However, αc > 2 implies that
2(2θc−1)+αc
(2+αc)θc
≥ 1, which, in
turn, implies that it must be qp <
2(2θc−1)+αc
(2+αc)θc
for all qp ∈ (0, 1). Thus, θcqp < 2(2θc−1)+αc2+αc .
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Therefore, C always prefers to implement policy c with b∗c = max{bc ∈ B|bc ≤ b̄c} as long as




then P prefers to implement policy c with bc = 1 as long as θcqp ≥ 1+αc2+αc because P always
implements policy c if bc > b̄c. Therefore, C provides b
∗








The general purpose of this dissertation was to explore the interactions between separation
of powers and competitive elections and their consequences in the policymaking process with
the tools of formal theory. This dissertation restricted its focus to a subset of the policy-
making process because there are so many dimensions involving the interactions between
separation of powers and competitive elections in the policymaking process. Specifically,
this dissertation focused on important aspects of policymaking, each of which arises in three
different stages of the policymaking process respectively: elections before policy formation,
the president’s unilateral policymaking power during policy formation, and funding decisions
in the policy implementation stage after policy formation.
In the second chapter, I examined how the super-majoritarian rule in the legislative
process affects voters’ behaviors in the election to form the legislature. Although the legisla-
tive gridlock region is well known for a direct consequence of the super-majoritarianism, it
has been neglected that the super-majoritarianism can affect the severity of the legislative
gridlock region indirectly through the interactions with elections. More specifically, if the
position of the status quo is neither too moderate nor too extreme, then certain voters have
incentives to elect a more extreme representative than themselves, and this sophisticated
voting results in the expansion of the size of the gridlock region. As a result, the model
demonstrated that the expansion of the gridlock region is caused in part by sophisticated
voting independent of the voters’ ideological distribution.
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In the third chapter, I focused on the president’s unilateral policymaking power, which
raises concerns among many scholars and pundits because such power appears to violate
the principle of separation of powers. However, it is surprising that the president does not
always rely on such unilateral power to enact a policy even if the legislative cannot restrain
the president’s unilateral action due to its collective action problem. To address this puz-
zle, I developed a formal model that demonstrated that elections provide constraints on the
president’s exercise of unilateral power, thereby contributing to maintaining the principle
of separation of powers in certain circumstances. Specifically, if we include elections to our
consideration about the president’s unilateral action, then we see that the president’s unilat-
eral action is a costly tool for voter mobilization. This is because the president’s unilateral
action activates all voters’ constitutional concerns, which increases the cost of voting that
leads the president’s supporters to abstain. However, it also provides extra expressive bene-
fits of voting to the president’s supporters who deeply care about the policy established by
the unilateral action. Hence, the president acts unilaterally to establish the policy only if its
mobilizing effects outweigh its demobilizing effects. This result implies that the president’s
unilateral action can be justified only if it acquires popular support that can compensate for
the lack of its constitutionality.
In the fourth chapter, I examined how separation of powers and competitive elections
interact in the context of funding decisions during the policy implementation stage. There
is a growing concern that separation of powers leads to a dysfunctional government. More-
over, separation of powers seems redundant because competitive elections can also discipline
politicians. This poses a theoretical puzzle. Why do we need separation of powers even
though we have competitive elections? Can separation of powers be justified based on its
welfare effects? To address these questions, I presented a formal model focusing on funding
decisions in the policy implementation stage. The central finding of the model is that sep-
aration of powers can improve voters’ welfare by mitigating the malign effects of electoral
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competition: the incumbent president’s underfunding to avoid the electoral risks associated
with policy implementation. But such welfare improvement is possible only in certain cir-
cumstances: when separation of powers change the motive behind the funding decision from
playing safe to gambling on failure or success. In addition, separation of powers can improve
voters’ welfare through blocking the implementation of a wrong policy. However, separation
of powers can also reduce voters’ welfare when the legislature has an incentive to play safely
in addition to the cases in which the legislature has a fear of failure. Such welfare-reducing
effects of separation of powers arise only when the challenger’s policy is initially believed to
be correct.
The findings from the three chapters demonstrate that the interactions between separa-
tion of powers and competitive elections affect political actors’ behaviors, thereby yielding
unexpected effects on policy outcome. This dissertation is agnostic with regard to whether
the framers also plan such interactions between the two institutional designs. Whether it is
or not, this dissertation demonstrated that it is necessary to consider the interactions be-
tween separation of powers and competitive elections, in addition to the original rationales
behind the two institutional designs, for a better understanding of political institutions and
the policymaking process in American politics.
The findings in the three essays provide interesting avenues of future research. In the
second chapter, I presented the importance of the location of the status quo, which can
be applied to analyze the president’s unilateral action. Given such unilateral policymak-
ing power, the presidents can tactically move the status quo into the opportunity region
to expand the gridlock region for their political ends. Since the position of the status quo
determines the position of the effective pivotal legislator through the electoral process, the
president may use their unilateral power to move the status quo into the opportunity region
before elections in order for the elected pivotal legislator to be much closer to their ideal
points. This extension of the model would be useful for understanding why the president’s
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unilateral action is followed by ideological polarization in the legislature.
In the third chapter, I suggested that the president’s unilateral action can be justified
only if it acquires popular support from voters. That is, there are two sources from which
the legitimacy of the president’s unilateral action originates: the principle of separation of
powers and electoral support. Recognizing such dual sources of the legitimacy suggests that
we pay more attention to possibly benign but neglected effects of the president’s unilateral
action on our democracy. At the same time, however, the model pointed out a fundamental
problem embedded in a representative democracy: Does the electoral outcome truly repre-
sent what most people want? In elections, the outcome is determined only by those who
turn out at the polling booths. The model demonstrated that the president could manipu-
late the electoral outcome by affecting the voters’ turnout rate. Even though the electoral
outcome deviates from what most people want in a particularistic presidency, the president’s
reelection can be superficially interpreted as a legitimate electoral outcome approved by most
people. However, this seemingly legitimate mandate comes from the majority manufactured
by the president’s unilateral action and not from the true majority of people, since the
particularistic presidency occurs in a hostile political landscape where most voters want to
replace the president. The model, therefore, calls for more careful attention to the normative
interpretations of the president’s unilateral action.
In the fourth chapter, I specified the conditions under which separation of powers leads
to the improvement of voters’ welfare. This finding may provide a rational theory of the
split-ticket voting. As Sigelman et al. (1997) nicely summarized, there have been two camps
regarding what motivates the voters to choose divided government. The first camp claimed
that “cognitive Madisonianism” (Ladd 1990), that is, the voters’ intrinsic preferences for
divided government, is what leads the voters to choose divided government (e.g., Erikson
1988; Jacobson 1990; Fiorina 1991, 1992). On the contrary, the other camp claimed that
divided government is an unintended consequence of the political structures of the U.S rather
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than the consequence of the voter’s strategic choices based on their desires for divided gov-
ernment (e.g., Campbell and Miller 1957; Sundquist 1988; Wattenberg 1995). Empirical
studies regarding this debate showed mixed results. The model contributes to this debate
by showing that there might be a strategic rationale behind the voters’ choices of divided
government based on their preferences for divided government. However, such preferences
for divided government are situationally-dependent rather than intrinsic and fixed. That is,
voters may prefer divided government to unified government only when divided government
can improve their welfare as the blue regions in Figure 4.4. Therefore, incorporating the vot-
ers’ decision on the type of government before the game between the incumbent president
and the challenger would be an interesting extension.
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